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This thesis deepens the understanding of real estate in the capital markets by 
addressing following three questions (1) how real estate risk influences 
corporate policies; (2) how securitized real estate manages the liquidity risk 
using real activities manipulation; (3) how investors’ behaviour affects the 
equity pricing in the securitized real estate market. 
 
In the first essay, I ask how capital heterogeneity influences corporate 
investment given that an option to grow the company through investment is 
subject to the riskiness of the firm’s asset. Using the US general firm data 
from 1985 to 2010, I include shocks to the real estate market as a proxy for 
state-variable risk in the asset pricing model and construct the real estate risk 
factor at the firm level. I document that the real estate risk embedded in 
corporate real estate holdings affects the corporate investment decisions made 
by firms’ managers (a negative effect), and further decreases long-term 
external financing in both equity and debt. 
 
In the second essay, I look into the characteristics of the securitized real estate, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). I explore how REITs manage the 
liquidity risk in the equity market considering that real estate is less liquid 
compared with other asset classes in nature. I show that REITs managers 
engage in real earnings management to attract more uninformed trading in 
order to provide the liquidity services at lower cost during seasoned equity 
offerings. I find less liquid REITs are more likely to manipulate earnings prior 
equity offerings, and uninformed trading is higher following the real earnings 
IX 
 
management. REITs set the offer price at a smaller discount after engaging in 
real earnings management and stock returns decline in the long run. The 
findings are consistent with real option and liquidity explanations for equity 
offerings. 
 
In the third essay, I study the pricing of the securitized real estate market from 
a behavioural perspective. I answer whether investor sentiment contributes to 
the price anomaly in REITs equity offerings, empirically addressing that 
REITs managers time the market to issue equity by timing the sentiment 
investors and the behaviour of investors impacts price formation around 
seasoned equity offerings. Consistent with the notion that market interprets 
SEO announcement in high sentiment periods as more negative signal, I find 
that announcement returns are negatively related to sentiment. Further, I 
document that investor sentiment is positively related with the SEO 
discounting and first day returns. Finally, sentiment does not seem to proxy for 
unobservable risk characteristic as I find that post-SEO long run returns are 
more negative in high sentiment periods.  
 
Overall, this thesis highlights the importance of real estate in corporate 
investment and corporate financing strategies. This research provides 
significant information on real estate values from novel perspectives as well as 




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This PhD thesis bundles three empirical essays on the role of real estate asset 
in capital market, aiming to provide significant information on real estate 
values from novel perspectives as well as guidance to the corporate policy 
decisions making for different firm managers. 
1.1 Research Background 
Real estate composes a significant part of firm’s portfolio. According to the 
survey in Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983), real estate assets comprise one-
quarter of firm’s assets on average. For manufacturing firms, this figure 
increases to about 40%.  
Firm owns real estate for a variety of reasons. Real estate has a slow 
depreciation rate (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). According to the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis report, non-residential real estate depreciates at a rate 
between 1.5% and 3%, far more slow than the other equipment. Unlike 
equipment, real estate is heterogeneous in space, which varies even cross the 
firms in the same industry. The lower risk embedded in real estate assets 
compared to other risky assets alters a firm’s underlying risk, which makes 
real estate an ideal investment strategy for portfolio diversification as well as 
inflation hedge. All the features of corporate real estate make corporate 
policies complex for corporate real estate holding firms.  
Firms can hold the real properties either by investing directly in real estate 
market or via securitized real estate. The development of securitized real estate 
has further bridged the capital market and the real estate market, which makes 
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the real estate strategies feasible for both corporate and individual investors. 
The most common form of securitized real estate is Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs). Created in United States, REITs offer institutions and 
individuals the opportunities to invest in real properties. The tax-exempt 
feature of REITs requires REITs to distribute a minimum 90% of their taxable 
income to investors as dividends, limiting the possibility of free cash flow. 
Restricted investment options on real estate assets, REIT managers’ cannot 
simply boost their compensation through activities like merger and 
acquisitions and also the dual performance measurement by net income and 
funds from operation limits agency problems. 
Regardless of recent advances in direct and securitized real estate, 
understanding of real estate in the context of capital market remain obscure, as 
both corporate and individual investors are uncertain about how far to invest in 
real estate due to the lack of sufficient information on the real estate vehicles.  
1.2 State of The Art 
Despite the recognized importance of real estate in many firms’ production 
and investment, past studies provide limited analysis on the effects of real 
estate. The finance literature has focused on the collateral effect of real estate 
assets. An increase in real estate value will exert a positive collateral effect on 
corporate investment. Gan (2007) uses a difference-in-difference approach, 
documenting that real estate holding firms are more vulnerable to real estate 
bubble bust than non-real estate holding firms in Japan. Chaney, Sraer and 
Thesmar (2012) finds a similar result using the U.S. firm data, concluding that 
firms expand investment via debt issuance when real estate prices increase as 
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they use real estate for project financing. In a production economy, Tuzel 
(2010) solves a general equilibrium with a high irreversibility cost for real 
estate and justifies that low depreciation rate of real estate deteriorates real 
estate holding firms’ capacity to productivity shocks. The amplified risk of 
real estate drives investors for a return premium when they invest in firms 
concentrated in real estate ownership(Ling, Naranjo and Ryngaert 2012). 
Meanwhile, capital adjustment cost is asymmetric, which indicates that firms 
are less flexible in downsizing capitals in bad times. Since the capital stocks of 
real estate holding firms have been more long-lived, countercyclical real estate 
risk would serve as an important factor for corporate investment, which, 
according to my knowledge, has not been examined in the existing literature 
before. 
Besides, for the equity pricing in the securitized real estate market, literature 
suggests that firms time seasoned equity offerings (SEO, thereafter) either by 
selling the overpriced shares (window of opportunity/behavioral hypothesis) 
or by exploiting the time-varying risk to minimize the cost of equity (the risk-
trade off hypothesis). In the context of REITs, I revisit those above hypothesis 
by analyzing from real earnings management and investor sentiment 
perspectives, both of which emerge out in recent years, to test whether real 
earnings management and investor sentiment stories reconcile with the current 
theoretical implications. 
1.3 Research Objective  
This thesis deepens the understanding of real estate in capital market by 
addressing following three questions (1) how real estate risk influences 
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corporate policies; (2) how securitized real estate manages the liquidity risk; 
(3) how investors’ behaviour affects the pricing in securitized real estate 
market. 
In the first essay, I ask how capital heterogeneity influences corporate 
investment given that an option to grow the company through investment is 
subject to the riskiness of the firm’s asset. Specifically, I examine how real 
estate risk impacts corporate policies. Previous studies identify real estate 
factor that explains much of the underlying risk inherent in classic asset 
pricing models via its collateral effects and its irreversibility. If investors 
understand the firm’s exposure to real estate risk, real estate risk should be 
correlated closely with both corporate investment and financing decisions 
made by firms.  
In the second essay, I look into the characteristics of the securitized real estate, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). I explore how REITs manage the 
liquidity risk in the equity market considering that real estate is less liquid 
compared with other asset classes in nature. The empirical corporate finance 
literature claims that information asymmetries would induce market frictions, 
which reduce the liquidity of the firm’s securities. However, real activities 
manipulation may reduce the concern given its cash flow consequences. 
Therefore, the research question for my second essay is how real earnings 
management activities influence REITs SEO dynamics.  
In the third essay, I study the pricing of securitized real estate market from a 
behavioural perspective. I ask whether investor sentiment contributes to the 
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price anomaly in REITs equity offerings, empirically testing whether 
managers time the market to issue equity by timing the sentiment investors.   
1.4 Intended Contribution 
The significance of this thesis is to provide significant information on 
corporate real estate values as well as guidance to the corporate investment 
and financing policy making for firm managers. 
In the first essay, I ask how capital heterogeneity influences corporate 
investment in a real option framework. First, this research highlights the role 
of real estate risk. Prior literature only focuses on the price level of the real 
estate assets. Second, this research establishes the link between real estate risk 
and corporate investment. Finally, this research contributes to the existing 
corporate investment, asset pricing, and corporate real estate literature by 
providing another setting in which real estate risk plays a nontrivial role in 
corporate investment. This research provides significant information on 
corporate real estate values as well as guidance to the corporate investment 
decisions making for firm managers. 
To further analyze how real estate interacts with the capital market, I examine 
managers’ incentives to issue seasoned equity offerings and their impact on 
SEO dynamics in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in my second and 
third essays. Literature suggests that firms time seasoned equity offerings 
(SEO, thereafter) either by selling the overpriced shares (window of 
opportunity/behavioral hypothesis) or by exploiting the time-varying risk to 
minimize the cost of equity (the risk-trade off hypothesis). I revisit those 
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above hypothesis by analyzing from real earnings management and investor 
sentiment perspectives, both of which emerge out in recent years, to test 
whether real earnings management and investor sentiment stories reconcile 
with the current theoretical implications. 
In my second essay, I examine the effect of real earnings management 
activities on REITs SEO dynamics. There is no study examining how real 
earnings management affects the stock return and cost of equity around 
seasoned equity offering. My research contributes to several strands of 
literature. First, I contribute to the REITs seasoned equity issuance literature 
by providing evidence that real earnings management influences REITs equity 
offering decision, supporting the notion that managers distort the earnings to 
time the market. Second, I contribute to the determinants of SEO discounting 
and underpricing by providing another important determinant - real earnings 
management. Third, I contribute to accounting literature by providing another 
setting where real earnings management plays a nontrivial role in market 
timing and price formation. Finally, this paper provides the empirical evidence 
on real earnings management and stock liquidity, supporting recent debates on 
information quality and liquidity risk. 
In my third essay, I investigate the price anomaly around seasoned equity 
offerings from a behavioral perspective, empirically testing whether managers 
time the market to issue equity by timing the sentiment investors. My 
contributions are manifold.  First, I contribute to the seasoned equity issuance 
literature by providing evidence that investor sentiment is positively related to 
pre-SEO mispricing levels, a relationship that further influences the REIT 
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equity offering decision and thus supports the notion that managers time the 
market in the presence of investor sentiment. Second, I contribute to the 
determinants of SEO discounting and underpricing by providing another 
important determinant--investor sentiment. Third, I contribute to the sentiment 
literature by providing an additional setting in which sentiment plays a 
nontrivial role in market timing and price formation in securitized real estate 
market.  
Overall, this research intends to contribute to the existing corporate 
investment, asset pricing, and corporate real estate literature by providing 
another setting in which real estate factor plays a nontrivial role in corporate 
investment and financing policy. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents the first essay, 
titled ― Real Estate Risk, Corporate Investment and Financing Choice. In the 
first essay, I ask whether capital heterogeneity influences corporate investment 
by examining the effect of real estate risk on corporate policies. To further 
analyze the real estate in capital market, I look into the characteristics of the 
securitized real estate, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).  In Chapter 
three titled-- Real Earning Management, Liquidity and REITs SEO dynamics, I 
analyze the consequence of real earnings management activities around REITs 
SEO. In Chapter four titled—Investor Sentiment and SEO pricing process: 
Evidence from REITs, I answer the price anomaly around seasoned equity 
offerings from a behavioral angle, empirically addressing that managers time 
the market to issue equity by timing the sentiment investors and the behavior 
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of investors impacts price formation around seasoned equity offerings. The 
final chapter concludes the thesis, highlights the limitations of the study, as 




CHAPTER 2 REAL ESTATE RISK, CORPORATE INVESTMENT 
AND FINANCING CHOICE 
 
Previous studies identify that real estate factor explains much of the 
underlying risk inherent in classic asset pricing models via its collateral effects 
and its irreversibility. Since a firm’s ability to finance new projects depends on 
its risk exposure, this chapter explores the link between the real estate risk and 
corporate investment. Using the US general firm data from 1985 to 2010, 
evidence shows that real estate risk is negatively associated with firms’ long-
term investments and long-term external financing in both equity and debt. 
However, the leverage depends on both the measure of risk and types of 
assets. Overall, in contrast to previously documented effect of the real estate 
value, risk exposure exhibits the mostly opposite effects on investment, 
financing, and capital structure.  
 






Real estate composes a significant part of firm’s portfolio. According to the 
survey in Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983), real estate assets comprise one-
quarter of firm’s assets on average. For manufacturing firms, this figure 
increases to about 40% with the book value amounting to $8.6 trillion in the 
early 2000s (Roulac 2003).
1
 
The unique features of corporate real estate compared to other capital goods 
contribute interesting influences on corporate finance. One strand of literature 
focuses on the collateral effect of real estate assets, suggesting that an increase 
in real estate value will exert a positive collateral effect on corporate financing 
hence investment. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) document that firms 
expand investment via debt issuance when real estate prices increase as they 
use real estate for project financing. Gan (2007) shows that the same channel 
makes real estate holding firms more vulnerable to real estate bubble bust than 
non-real estate holding firms in Japan. Another strand of literature examines 
the effect of real estate holding on real or financial portfolio risks. Tuzel 
(2010) models a general equilibrium in a production economy, in which high 
irreversibility cost and low depreciation rate of real estate deteriorate firms’ 
capacity to sustain through productivity shocks. Ling, Naranjo and Ryngaert 
(2012) also document that real estate intensive firms exposes to greater real 
estate risk. Consequently, investors demand a higher return premium when 
they invest in firms concentrated in real estate ownership (Funke, Gebken, 
Gaston and Lutz 2010) and hedge funds that concentrate in real estate strategies 
                                                            
1 The core (i.e., non-specialized) business for real estate investment by institutional 
investors amounts to $3.2 trillion 
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underperform(Ambrose, Cao and D'Lima 2013).However, none of these studies 
have examined how the risk of real estate assets affects corporate real 
investment.  
The risk of real estate assets also differs from those of other capital goods. 
First, real estate has a slow depreciation rate(Glaeser and Gyourko 2005) 
Second, unlike equipment, real estate is heterogeneous in space, which varies 
even cross the firms in the same industry. Furthermore, the lower risk 
embedded in real estate assets compared to other risky assets alters a firm’s 
underlying risk, which makes real estate an ideal investment strategy for 
portfolio diversification as well as inflation hedge(Ambrose, Cao and D'Lima 
2013). Since asset liquidation values determine a firm’s financing capacity, 
corporate real estate holdings are likely to affect firm’s investment decisions. 
All the features of corporate real estate make corporate policies complex for 
corporate real estate holding firms.  
In this paper, I ask whether capital heterogeneity influences corporate 
investment given that an option to grow the company through investment is 
subject to the riskiness of the firm’s asset. It follows the spirit of Berk, Green 
and Naik (1999), in which the firm value comes from the value of assets-in-
place and the value of growth options, and the firm’s investment decision is to 
exercise the real option to maximize firm value. The value of the option 
depends on demand shock level and risk, current and new investment 
production capacity, operational costs, and adjustment cost. Meanwhile, 
capital adjustment cost is asymmetric, which indicates that firms are less 
flexible in downsizing capitals in bad times. Since the capital stocks of real 
12 
 
estate holding firms have been more long-lived, countercyclical real estate risk 
would serve as an important factor for corporate investment, which, according 
to my knowledge, has not been examined in the existing literature before. 
In the empirical analysis, I focus on the real estate assets holding, not only 
because it empirically captures the adjustment costs through its irreversibility 
feature, but also because the addition exposure to real estate market capture 
both the risk of assets and the correlated risk between different types of assets, 
i.e., real estate assets and other corporate assets. Specifically, I examine how 
real estate risk impacts corporate policies. If investors understand the firm’s 
exposure to real estate risk, real estate risk should be correlated closely with 
both corporate investment and financing decisions made by firms. I use two 
measures of real estate risk. The first one is a real estate industry specific risk 
which uses residuals from an estimation of REITs on capital market portfolio 
in time series.  The second one measures the individual firms’ exposure to real 
estate risk, i.e., an estimated beta on REITs returns from a two-factor model 
including both the capital market factor and the real estate factor. I find that 
both real estate risk measures are negatively associated with corporate 
investment and external financing. However, the overall leverage effect is 
mixed due to the additional collateral effect in debt financing and related 
credit market condition. In addition to the above new evidence, I also include 
the value of real estate holdings in the analysis and I find that the value of real 
estate is positively associated with debt financing and investment. The results 
are consistent with extant empirical evidence in the literature about this effect 
through collateral channel (Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar 2012). 
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So far this research is the first to directly examine the real estate risk on firm’s 
corporate investment and its financing policies. My paper makes important 
contributions to the literature: First, while prior empirical literature focuses on 
only the price level of the real estate assets, this paper highlights the role of 
real estate risk. Gan (2007) document that firms holding real estate assets are 
more vulnerable to real estate bubble bust than non-real estate holding firms in 
Japan, which is the closest to examine the effect of risk in term time series 
fluctuation. However, the bubble burst is a specific case and the event is 
unambiguously significant. My paper provides the missing link -investment, 
between the production and assets pricing studies that are related to real estate 
assets holding in corporations. Second, my hypotheses are aligned with studies 
on how assets irreversibility affects firm production. Tuzel (2010) suggests 
that, in a production economy, the general equilibrium shows that high 
irreversibility cost and low depreciation rate of real estate held by the firm 
deteriorate firms’ capacity to adjust for productivity shocks. I further illustrate 
the mechanism through investment in this channel. Moreover, my discussion 
on the cross sectional pattern that, firms with high real estate risk have low 
investment, is also intuitively an alternative explanation for the empirical 
evidence in the assets pricing literature that hedge fund strategies that target on 
real estate underperforms (Ambrose, Cao and D'Lima 2013), aside from the 
vague explanation that extra risk estate exposure requires additional premium, 
which actually implies high returns. Finally, this research provides significant 
information on corporate real estate values as well as guidance to the corporate 
investment decisions making for firm managers. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. I review the relevant literature in Section II 
and identify the literature gap. Section III displays the model and constructs 
the hypotheses. Section IV describes the data and empirical design. Section V 
discusses the empirical results. Section VI presents the robustness test.  This 
paper closes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Corporate investment and asset-in-place 
When evaluating corporate investment decisions, researchers often view it in a 
real option framework(McDonald and Siegel 1985; McDonald and Siegel 
1986). An option to grow the company through investment is subject to the 
riskiness of the firm’s asset-in-place, which also determines the expected 
returns.  
Existing literatures establish the connection between investment decisions, the 
riskiness of asset-in-place, and expected stock returns. Berk, Green and Naik 
(1999) assumes that firms owns two kinds of assets, asset-in-place and growth 
options and predict that size and market-to-book ratio can present the overall 
riskiness of assets in place. Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) relax Berk, 
Green, and Naik (1999)’s model on some restrictions and get similar results in 
equilibrium. Considering in a competitive market setting, Zhang  (2005) 
extends the model and suggests that the value premium is likely to be 
influenced by the business cycle. In Cooper (2006)’s model which includes the 
fixed adjustment costs in investment decisions, Cooper (2006) documents 
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empirical evidence that investment spikes are significantly correlated with 
expected returns. And Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2006) develop two 
models to link the expected return and endogenous corporate investment 
decision determined by firm’s asset in place. They suggest that the book-to-
market effect is driven by gearing and the size effect is relevant to the 
proportional growth. 
So far, though the literature has documented that expected returns are affected 
by firm-level decisions which are endogenously determined by firms’ 
underlying risk, no analysis has been provided on either how the composition 
of firms’ capital, like a real estate component, will affect the corporate 
investment or how this will contribute to the expect stock returns. 
2.2.2 Real estate and asset pricing 
Real estate composes a significant part of both firms’ asset portfolio and 
households’ portfolio. Real estate returns are expected to contribute to cross 
sectional variations of asset returns. Fluctuations in real estate impact the real 
economy through its interaction with asset and credit markets. Recent 
literature use real estate markets in the context of asset pricing.  
Studies relevant to real estate asset pricing include Stambaugh (1982), Flavin 
and Yamashita (2002), Kullmann(2003), Lustig and Van NieuIrburgh (2005), 
and Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel(2007). Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 
(2005) and Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) incorporate the important 
role of housing for household consumption to the Consumption CAPM and 
document that a factor based on housing consumption is priced cross-
sectionally. Stambaugh (1982) uses several asset groups to construct the 
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market portfolio and find a significant explanation power in proxies for 
residential real estate. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) examine the household 
portfolio choice using exogenous returns, in which housing factor is 
economically significant. Other studies construct a real estate included market 
portfolio to test the asset pricing models and find a significant explanation 
power in returns for real estate proxies. In Kullman (2003)’s test for asset 
pricing models, he constructs a market portfolio using residential real estate 
returns and commercial real estate returns. For the measure of commercial real 
estate, he measures the returns from real estate investment trusts. He 
documents results more significant using real estate included market portfolio. 
Furthermore, Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) find that there is a 
significant relation between the ratio of housing wealth and market price of 
risk, and suggest that real estate factor has asset pricing implications. In 
Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007)’s equilibrium asset pricing model, they 
show that the housing composition in the consumption bundle is in the pricing 
kernel and hence implies for asset pricing. Funke, Gebken, Gaston and Lutz 
(2010) further document that a real estate factor explains much of the 
underlying risk inherent in the Fama-French size and value factors. 
2.2.3 Real estate and corporate policies 
The extant literature shows that unique features of real estate assets compared 
to other capital goods are associated with several interesting patterns in 
corporate finance. The diverse effects can be grouped by the following three 
channels: the collateral, the lending and the adjustment cost. The first strand of 
research is on the collateral effects of real estate. Collateral is vital in bank 
lending given that 70% of all commercial and industrial loans are issued on a 
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secured basis (Berger and Udell 1990). An increase in real estate value will 
exert a positive collateral effect on corporate investments. Gan (2007) uses a 
difference-in-difference approach, documenting that real estate holding firms 
are more vulnerable to real estate bubble bust than non-real estate holding 
firms in Japan. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) finds a similar result using 
the U.S. firm data that firms increase debt issuance when real estate prices 
increase as they use real estate as collateral for project financing. The second 
strand of research is on the lending channel of banks. Banks in general have a 
significant exposure to real estate markets given their lending and direct 
investment in the real estate sectors. Therefore, shocks to real estate markets 
could transmit to the real economy via the banks’ reduced lending to firms, 
taking the subprime crisis as an example. This, in turn, would force the firms 
to forego the profitable investments. In Gan (2007)’s study, she documents 
that when there is a significant decline in real estate values, banks are credit-
constraints and firms reliant on banks’ supply have to invest less. Similar 
results are also found in Peek and Rosengren (2000), who apply the Japanese 
banking crisis in the early 1990s as an event study and document a significant 
negative real effect of the bank loan supply shock on the construction activity. 
The third strand of research focus on the irreversibility costs for real estate. In 
a production economy, Tuzel (2010) suggests the general equilibrium with a 
high irreversibility cost for real estate and justifies that low depreciation rate 
of real estate deteriorates real estate holding firms’ capacity to productivity 
shocks. And she also documents the empirical evidence on real estate holdings 
and firm’s risk using the U.S. firm data. Ling, Naranjo and Ryngaert (2012) 
further examine how sensitive the stock returns to a real estate factor using the 
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retail firm data, indicating that  real estate intensive firms get a greater 
exposure to a real estate factor. 
To summarize, the use of collateral, reliance on bank financing, and high 
sensitivity to the business cycle may provide the basis for firms to be affected 
by the real economy via real estate risk. The swing in real estate markets 
determines the time-varying investment opportunities via different channel. 
Though some works have been done on real estate and asset pricing, how the 
real estate component contributes to the corporate investment is unclear. Since 
corporate financing activities like equity offerings will be directly linked to 
firm’s investment decisions, it can be expected that those firms who are more 
susceptible for financing channels than others, would potentially monitor the 
real estate market when making their corporate financing decisions.  
2.3 Hypothesis 
The recent approach to analyze corporate investment decisions is to consider it 
in a real option framework (Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Dixit and Pindyck 
1994; McDonald and Siegel 1985; McDonald and Siegel 1986). The 
investment can change the firm’s risk profile in response to whether the 
growth option is finite and infinite. Also, the increase in tangible assets like 
real estate and equipment will likely to impact the operating leverage, 
changing the underlying risk. And all the corporate assets can be viewed as a 
portfolio of puts of the firm like the securities in corporate finance.  
Classic real investment model proposes the valuation of the firm comprises of 
a growing perpetuity generated by assets-in-place and the value of growth 
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options generated from corporate investment. In a production economy, Tuzel 
(2010) suggests the general equilibrium with a high irreversibility cost for real 
estate and justifies that low depreciation rate of real estate deteriorates real 
estate holding firms’ capacity to productivity shocks. Therefore the firm’s 
value is also determined by the asset heterogeneity of the firm. The amplified 
risk of real estate relative to other forms of capital drives investors for a return 
premium when they invest in firms concentrated in real estate ownership. 
According to Tuzel (2010), firms invest in real estate assets will have higher 
adjustment cost (cost of irreversibility) than invest in non-real estate assets. To 
understand this result, recognize that developing a land implies that the firm 
foregoes some current profits. These foregone profits are a cost of not 
investing, and must be offset by a more valuable option to motivate alternative 
asset investment. Firm’s exposure to real estate risk undermines firm’s ability 
to counter with bad productivity shocks and thus investors will require higher 
risk premium. Clearly, firm manager make the corporate investment decision 
as a trade-off between firm’s asset-in-place value and potential cash flow of 
the corporate investment. As a result, the firm exposing to more real estate risk 
optimally invests at a lower demand level. Therefore, I hypothesize, 
Hypothesis1 Firm’s exposure to real estate risk reduces the corporate 
investment. 
Firms often go to capital market to fund their investments. Firms deploy real 
estate as collaterals for project financing. Nevertheless, the financing cost 
depends on the capital market dynamics and risk of firm value, hence the risk 
of its assets-in-place. Although the collateral channel suggests that the value of 
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assets-in-place, in particular, real estate assets, enables better access to debt 
financing, the risk of real estate, disregarding whether it comes from the 
market fluctuation, such as a downturn in housing/equity markets or firms’ 
heterogeneous exposure to the markets, increases the uncertainty of future 
cash flows, hence hurts firms’ credit worthiness. Therefore, the risk of assets 
raises firms’ financing costs in both equity and debt, and reduces firms’ 
external financing capacity. Meanwhile, fluctuations in real estate markets 
affect a firm’s debt capacity as well as the level of investment as discussed 
previously. Since part of the investment can be used as further collateral, the 
shrink in investment exacerbates the reduction in firm’s debt capacity or 
increase the cost of debt, influencing the financing channel. In this case, firms 
with high ownership concentrations in real estate have to further forego 
profitable investment and reduce output. Hence, 
Hypothesis2: In the presence of external financing, firm’s exposure to real 
estate risk reduces external financing in both equity and debt.  
Since assets market shocks are often correlated with real economy shocks, the 
bank industry is likely to go through a credit crunch during the assets markets’ 
downturn period. The debt financing may be decreased more than equity 
financing because of this feedback effect. Therefore, the overall leverage is 
likely to be negatively associated with the assets risk in time series pattern. In 
cross section, however, while the assets risk raises financing cost in both 
equity and debt, assets with collateral values may help reduce the cost in debt. 
Therefore, firm leverage is likely to be positively associated with the portion 
of collateral assets in the firm. Therefore, how the risk of assets-in-place is 
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correlated with firm leverage depends on the measurement of the risk and 
composition of assets.    
Hypothesis3A: The market wide risk of firm’s assets-in-place reduces firms’ 
leverage. 
Hypothesis3B: The exposure to collateral assets’ risk raises firm’s leverage. 
 
2.4 Data and Empirical Design 
The sample includes a panel of US firms from 1985 to 2010. I exclude 
financial, energy industries, and REITs (identified with “6” in the first digit of 
SIC code). The accounting data are retrieved from COMPUSTAT, and the 
stock return data from CRSP. I choose to measure the risk of real estate assets 
held by the firm for two reasons: First, the adjustment cost of any particular 
type of assets lacks variation within itself, but differs across the real estate 
assets and other corporate assets, hence I can use the exposure or relative 
portion of real estate assets over total assets as a good proxy for the adjustment 
cost. Second, I want to measure both the time series and cross sectional 
variation in the risk of assets. The real estate assets is better than general 
corporate assets, because the real estate market fluctuation is not as correlated 




2.4.1 Measuring Real Estate Factor 
In this paper, I deploy the overall returns on real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) as the basis for the real estate factor. Created in United States, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), offer individuals the opportunities to invest 
in real properties. Restrictions on  investment options for  real estate assets and 
regulations on dividend pay-outs  (Boudry 2011) force REITs to rely primarily 
on external financing to fund investments; they use external financing far 
more often than  general firms do (Boudry, Kallberg and Liu 2011; Ott, 
Riddiough and Yi 2005). These frequent forays to the market result in the 
disclosure of more information about the firm, and thus reduce information 
asymmetry. Thus, REITs contain the timely information about the public real 
estate market. Also, given that REITs are excluded from the portfolio 
formation of the major asset pricing factors like Fama-French factors, using 
REITs return will isolate the effect of real estate factors from test assets and 
other pricing factors(Funke, Gebken, Gaston and Lutz 2010). 
I extract the variation in real estate by orthogonalizing the excess REIT returns 
to the excess market return in the following model. 
                                                                                (1) 
where       is the returns on the composite REITs index
2
 minus,     is the 
returns on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and both are measured in 
excess of the risk-free rate    on U.S. 3-month treasury. The regression is 
                                                            
2 Composite REITs index contains a broad set of publicly-traded real estate, including equity 
REITs (EREITs), hybrid REITs (HREITs), and mortgage REITs (MREITs). The index data is 




conducted with monthly data, and then for each year, we sum up the residuals. 
I define the real estate specific risk (REF) with the yearly residual     which 
gives us measures of a time series real estate assets risk. 
 
2.4.2 Measuring Firm-level Real Estate Factor 
I am mindful that firms react differently to the real estate risk since there is a 
variation in corporate real estate holdings. To address this difference, I further 
construct the firm level real estate exposure/intensity by employing a multi-
factor asset pricing framework (Jorion 1990; Ling, Naranjo and Ryngaert 
2012). To determine the market and real estate risk exposure, I estimate the 
following two factor model using monthly data. 
            
               
                                          (2) 
where     is the return on firm stocks,     is the returns on 3-month treasury, 
     is the returns on REITs, and      is the returns on the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio. I calculate firm’s betas prior observation month by 
regressing their past 60 month returns on the market and real estate factors. 
Observations with less than 24 months return data in their previous 60 months 
are excluded. The coefficient   
   is the market beta. The coefficient   
   (the 
real estate beta) is the firm i’s exposure to the real estate risk, after controlling 
the stock market exposure. I prefer the two-factor equation here over Fama-
French equation, because the beta measured from the latter are likely suffer 
from a correlated-error problem as large firms are more likely to hold real 
estate than small firms.  Nevertheless, I conduct robustness test with the latter.   
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2.4.3 Real Estate Factor and Corporate Investment 
To analyze the impact of real estate factor on corporate investment, I run a 
standard investment equation for firm i, at date t, with 
                                                                                (3) 
Where     is the ratio of investment to PPE,       is the firm level real 
estate risk exposure,    is firm fixed effect,    is time fixed effect. Firm 
characteristics control variables follow the conventions in the literature: I use 
the nature logarithm of firm’s market capitalization (Size) as firm size, the 
logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book value (logMB) as 
market-to-book ratio. To capture the firm’s financial slack, I use cash flows 
including both cash and short-term investment measured as log(Cash). I 
measure financing both in term of access and amount.  
My goal is to provide an estimate of the financial multiplier (i.e. by how much 
an increase in real estate volatility increases/decreases investment) at the firm-
level. Be minded that the coefficient measures how investment responds to 
real estate risk overall (real estate market factor), as well as how a firm's 
investment responds to each additional increase in real estate volatility the 
firm exposes to (firm level real estate risk exposure). The specification allows 
me to abstract from real estate shocks that would affect both firms with and 
without real estate assets. 
However, I am mindful that there might be endogeneity in the estimation of 
equation that real estate risk could be correlated with investment opportunities. 
I address the influence using the financial crisis as a natural experiment. 
During the financial crisis, all firms are experiencing the downturns of the real 
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economy and shrink their investment. The downturn in real estate market is 
unlikely to provide firm with the investment opportunities during the subprime 
crisis.  
2.4.4 Real Estate Risk and Corporate Financing Choice 
Standard finance theories with credit/collateral constraints predict that an 
increasing collateral value will lead to more debt issuance. Secured on the 
appreciated value of land holdings, Gan (2007) and Chaney, Sraer and 
Thesmar (2012) find that an increase in real estate value will exert a positive 
collateral effect on corporate investments. However, the inherent assumption 
in their papers is that the real estate risk is relatively constant with other asset 
classes. Since the risk embedded in real estate assets alters a firm’s underlying 
risk and affect the liquidation value, the firm is likely to resort to an alternative 
outside financing instead of debt issuance. I intend to analyze how the real 
estate risk affects the financing choices as follows. 
                                                                               (4) 
where     is external financing such as debt and equity issuance, respectively. 
For the analysis is on debt financing,       are log(new debt issuance amount) 
and log(change in debt balance) observed for each firm in each year, 
respectively.      is real estate industry specific risk and firms’ exposure to 
real estate risk,    is firm fixed effect, and    is time fixed effect. Control 
variables include market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and others that are 
identified in the previous studies. 
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As for equity issuance,       takes both the access and amount. To measure 
access,       takes the value 1 if the firm i issues equity in year t, otherwise 0. 
For the amount,        takes log(equity issuance amount) for firm i and year t.   
2.4.5 Control variables 
I include a set of control variables for firms’ characteristics that have been 
documented in previous studies. I use the nature logarithm of firm’s market 
capitalization (Size) to control for firm size. I calculate firms’ market-to-book 
ratio (logMB) as the logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book 
value in the most recent quarter.  Cash and short-term investment (Cash) is 
applied to control firm’s financial slack. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 describes the key variables and the controls will be used in this 
research. Variables are the real estate risk, firm level real estate risk exposure, 
firm real estate value, market-to-book ratio, cash, and leverage. 
 [Insert Table 2.1] 
In Figure 2.1 I plot in Figure 1 the market returns and the estimated real estate 
industry specific risk (REF) across the sample over 1985 to 2010. It is salient 
that the market and real estate specific returns have varied significantly over 
time. These two markets co-moves better and the volatility is relatively 
smaller in real estate market prior 1997 than afterwards. Both real estate risk 
and market risk exhibit wider fluctuations in early 2000s when the tech-bubble 
hits the peak and burst with market suffered from a downturn and bottomed 
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out in 2000. After 2005, real estate market fluctuates more than the stock 
market as the subprime crisis emerges. 
 
 [Insert Figure 2.1] 
To verify that firm’s exposure to real estate risk is not a mimicking for the 
market exposure, I form 10*10 portfolios based on firm size and real estate βs 
estimated with data in the prior five years in any during 1985 to 2010. Then I 
estimate the portfolio’s real estate beta and market beta. 
Table 2.2 shows average returns, post-ranking real estate βs and market βs for 
portfolios formed from 1985 to 2010. Forming portfolios on size and pre-
ranking real estate βs helps to magnify the range of both post-ranking real 
estate βs and market βs. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the average monthly 
returns for each portfolio. The spread of return across the 10 real estate β 
deciles is smaller than the spread across the 10 size deciles. And the spreads of 
average returns across the real estate β deciles decrease with firm’s size. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 2.2 show the distributions of post-ranking real 
estate βs and market βs for the portfolio. It is observed that post-ranking real 
estate βs closely reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking real estate βs. 
However, the post-ranking market βs seem to reproduce the inverse ordering 
of the pre-ranking real estate βs. This again suggests that real estate factor is 
not a mimicking factor for the market factor. 
 [Insert Table 2.2] 
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2.5.2 Real Estate Risk and Corporate Investment 
Table 2.3 presents the results on real estate risk and corporate investment 
level. The dependent variable is corporate investment level scaled by lagged 
PPE (in logarithm) in the observation year. The independent variables are the 
real estate risk factor (REF), firm level real estate risk factor, firm real estate 
exposure (risk loading), firm real estate value, market-to-book ratio, cash, and 
leverage.  
Column (1) reports the results with the simplest estimation with only control 
variables, and they explain about 8.9 % of corporate investment. In Column 
(2), I include only the real estate industry specific risk (REF) as the 
independent variable. I find that the coefficient is negative and significant and 
REF by itself explains 1.4 % variation of corporate investment. In Column (3), 
I include only the firms’ exposure to real estate risk (REF exposure) in the 
specification. The coefficient is also significantly negative, with an 
explanation power of 2.15% on the investment variation. From Column (4) to 
Column (6), I include both real estate risk and controls in the specification. 
The coefficients for the real estate risk measures remain negative and 
significant. All the adjusted R
2
s have significantly improvement after 
incorporating the real estate risk measures. Column (7), I include firm’s real 
estate value (RE value scaled by PPE) in specification. I find that, in 
consistent with previous studies(Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012), the 
coefficient is positive and significant.  
It is problematic to directly measure adjustment costs. Nevertheless, as real 
estate assets have higher adjustment cost   compared to other corporate assets, 
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it is reasonable to assume that the portion of real estate assets over total assets 
is highly correlated with firms’ assets’ adjustment cost. In column (8), I 
include real estate assets portion in the specification. I find that the coefficient 
on the real estate assets portion is significantly negative.  
Overall, the results in table 2.3 provide support to the hypotheses that 
corporate investment is negatively associated with the real estate risk.   
 [Insert Table 2.3] 
To control for the endogeneity in investment opportunity, I run the regression 
in the subsample from 2007 to 2009, when the twin crises in real estate market 
and real economy both occurred. This setting gives two advantages: First the 
investment opportunity is relatively and homogeneously low for all firms in 
the twin crises; and second, the correlated risk between real estate and other 
corporate assets are high during the crisis period. I find that the coefficients on 
the real estate risk measures remain significantly negative and the magnitude 
of all the measures are greater compared with those in whole sample result. 
However, the measure for the firm real estate value loses its explanation 
power in the subsample, which suggests that the findings on the real estate 
value in relation to investment during crisis (Gan 2007) is indeed a specific 
case of our model’s prediction on risk, rather than the effect of real estate 
value.  
 [Insert Table 2.4] 
2.5.3 Real Estate Risk and Corporate Financing Choice 
Standard finance theories with credit/collateral constraints predict that an 
increasing collateral value leads to more debt issuance. Secured on the 
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appreciated value of land holdings, Gan (2007) and Chaney, Sraer and 
Thesmar (2012) find that an increase in real estate value will exert a positive 
collateral effect on corporate investments. However, the inherent assumption 
in their papers is that the real estate risk is relatively constant with other asset 
classes. Since the risk embedded in real estate assets alters a firm’s underlying 
risk and affect the liquidation value, the firm is likely to resort to an alternative 
external financing instead of debt financing. 
2.5.3.1 Debt Financing 
Table 2.5 presents the results of multivariate regression on real estate risk and 
inflows of debt: long term debt issuance. Coefficients for all the real estate risk 
measures are negative and significant. I find that when the real estate risk 
increases, real estate holding firms make fewer debt issuances. Columns (5) to 
(7) confirm the robustness by looking at the relation between the real estate 
risk and changes in long-term debt. Borrowers are likely to resort to other 
financing methods than long-term liabilities to finance their additional 
investment in the face of heightened real estate risk. In comparison, when the 
firm real estate value increases, firm resorts to debt financing via the collateral 
channel of real estate. 
[Insert Table 2.5] 
2.5.3.2 Equity Financing 
As firms’ assets risk also affect equity financing cost, I report in table 2.6 the 
results on how equity financing is affected. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when the firm issue new equity in the 
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year, otherwise zero. I find that both real estate risk measures are significantly 
and negatively associated with the likelihood of firm issuing new equity. The 
coefficient on firm real estate value however is negative and significant, which 
aligns with crowding of debt through collateral effects. 
 [Insert Table 2.6] 
I further test how much the equity issuance quantitatively could be explained 
by the real estate risk. In Table 2.7, I regress log(new equity issuance amount) 
on real estate risk and firm characteristics. I find that both real estate risk 
measures are significantly and negatively associated with the amount raised 
through equity. Overall, the results in table 2.6 and 2.7 support my hypothesis 
that the risk of real estate assets raises financing costs, which reduces equity 
financing. 
[Insert Table 2.7] 
2.5.3.3 Real Estate Risk and Capital Structure 
The final question on the real estate risk is whether this effect persists. 
Cvijanovic (2013) documents the collateral channel of real estate exerts a long 
term impact on firm’s capital structure. An increase in collateral value will 
reduce a firm’s annualized cost of debt in the long term, highlighting the 
importance of collateral values in mitigating information imperfections.  
Table 2.8 presents the results of multivariate regression on real estate risk and 
capital structure. The result shows that the real estate industry specific risk is 
negatively associated with the leverage (H3A). However, in cross sectional, 
firm specific exposure to real estate market is positively associated with firm 
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leverage (H3B), but the magnitude is small. In Columns (3) to (4), I conduct 
robustness test by replace the leverage with its change as the dependent 
variable and the results are consistent with those in the first two columns.   
 [Insert Table 2.8] 
 
2.6 Robustness Check 
In unreported analysis, besides employing a two factor asset pricing 
framework in the main analysis, I use other multi-factor models, including 
Fama-French factor models, models with lagged beta structures. All results are 
qualitatively similar across the various multi-factor model representations. 
2.7 Conclusions  
Real estate composes a significant part of firm’s portfolio. However, very little 
is known about the effects of real estate risk on these firms. This research 
explores the link between the real estate risk and corporate investment of these 
firms. Using the US general firm data from 1985 to 2010, I document that real 
estate risk embedded in corporate real estate holdings affect the corporate 
investment decisions made by firms’ managers (a negative effect), and 
decrease the external finance in both debt and equity. 
So far this research is the first to directly examine the real estate risk on firm’s 
corporate investment and its performance. While real estate composes a 
significant part of firm’s portfolio, very little is known about the effects of real 
estate risk on these firms. My paper fills the gap with empirical tests. This 
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research also provides significant information on corporate real estate values 





Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table describes the key variables and the controls will be used in this 
research. Variables are the real estate risk measures at the market and the firm 
level, firm level real estate risk exposure, market-to-book ratio, cash and 
leverage. 
 
Panel A    
 REF    RE exposure 
Mean -0.00179  0.261 
Medium -0.00283  0.215 
Standard Deviation 0.0136  0.792 
Observations 61063  61063 
 
Panel B      
 Investment Cash Asset Market-
to-book 
Leverage 
Mean 0.256 2.193 5.468 1.590 0.316 
Medium 0.191 2.190 5.381 1.109 0.302 
Standard Deviation 2.594 2.420 2.185 2.011 0.252 






Figure 2.1 The market factor and the real estate risk from 1985 to 2010 
The figure plots the market factor and the estimated real estate risk across the 
sample over 1985 to 2010. Real estate risk is calculated by using in the 
following model. 
                    
Where       is the excess REIT return, calculated as the returns on the 
composite REITs index minus the U.S risk-free rate.     is the return on the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio in excess of the U.S risk-free rate. The real 





Table 2.2 Average Returns, Post-Ranking βs For Portfolios Formed on Size and then Real Estate β:  1985 to 2010 
This table presents the average returns, post-ranking betas for portfolios formed on firm size and firm level real estate risk 
exposure (beta). Firm level real estate risk exposure and market beta estimated using the following model. 
            
               
                 
Where       is the excess REIT return, calculated as the returns on the composite REITs index minus the U.S risk-free rate.     
is the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio in excess of the U.S risk-free rate. The coefficient   
   is the market beta. The 
coefficient   
   (the real estate beta) is the firm i’s exposure to the real estate risk factor, after controlling the stock market 
movement. All betas prior observation month is calculated by regressing their past 60 month returns on market and real estate 
factors. Observations with less than 24 months return data in their prior 60 months are excluded. 
 
 
  All Low-β β-2 β-3 β-4 β-5 β-6 β-7 β-8 β-9 High-β 
        Panel A: Average Monthly Returns         
All 1.18% 1.30% 1.10% 1.08% 1.01% 1.01% 1.12% 1.16% 1.20% 1.29% 1.52% 
Small-ME 1.87% 2.29% 1.88% 1.74% 1.79% 1.74% 1.64% 1.62% 1.64% 1.89% 2.47% 
ME-2 1.42% 1.82% 1.26% 1.31% 0.90% 1.09% 1.28% 1.48% 1.52% 1.70% 1.83% 
ME-3 1.20% 1.38% 1.24% 1.20% 1.21% 0.85% 1.14% 0.97% 1.10% 1.18% 1.72% 
ME-4 1.15% 1.22% 1.18% 1.10% 0.76% 0.79% 1.11% 1.08% 1.23% 1.50% 1.52% 
ME-5 1.03% 1.13% 0.76% 0.74% 0.80% 0.97% 1.15% 1.11% 1.25% 1.17% 1.18% 
ME-6 1.02% 0.93% 0.88% 0.95% 0.93% 0.93% 0.97% 1.16% 1.01% 1.07% 1.37% 
ME-7 1.06% 1.15% 0.94% 0.97% 0.83% 0.95% 1.03% 1.17% 1.14% 1.18% 1.29% 
ME-8 1.06% 0.88% 1.02% 0.98% 1.01% 0.95% 1.08% 1.07% 1.09% 1.18% 1.28% 
ME-9 1.02% 1.23% 0.79% 0.95% 0.92% 0.97% 0.85% 0.98% 1.17% 1.07% 1.31% 
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  All Low-β β-2 β-3 β-4 β-5 β-6 β-7 β-8 β-9 High-β 
Panel B: Post Ranking real estate βs 
All 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.51 
Small-ME 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.33 
ME-2 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.32 
ME-3 0.24 0.01 0.16 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.12 0.26 0.45 
ME-4 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.47 
ME-5 0.33 0.13 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.37 0.46 0.54 
ME-6 0.36 0.06 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.34 0.50 0.59 
ME-7 0.35 0.08 0.18 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.65 
ME-8 0.33 0.02 0.17 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.46 0.64 
ME-9 0.25 -0.05 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.66 
Large-ME 0.14 -0.19 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.45 
 
        Panel C: Post Ranking market βs         
All 0.80 1.36 0.99 0.76 0.70 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.74 0.80 
Small-ME 0.71 1.14 0.80 0.74 0.71 0.54 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.68 0.79 
ME-2 0.76 1.22 0.90 0.79 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.68 0.56 0.74 0.79 
ME-3 0.76 1.28 0.93 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.75 0.82 
ME-4 0.77 1.36 0.99 0.69 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.58 0.66 0.72 0.87 
ME-5 0.78 1.39 0.87 0.69 0.59 0.61 0.69 0.71 0.64 0.77 0.82 
ME-6 0.79 1.42 0.99 0.71 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.76 0.86 
ME-7 0.81 1.40 1.00 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.75 0.77 
ME-8 0.83 1.39 1.09 0.76 0.76 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.75 
ME-9 0.88 1.49 1.10 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.74 
Large-ME 0.91 1.51 1.20 0.98 0.90 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.76 
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Table 2.3 Real Estate Risk and Corporate Investment 
This table presents the results on real estate risk and corporate investment level. The dependent variable is corporate investment level scaled 
lagged PPE (in logarithm) in the observation year. The independent variables are firm level real estate risk exposure, the real estate risk, 
market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and sale. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses. 
Y= log (CAPEX/PPE) 




























     
0.00880***   
      
(6.59)   
RE weight       -0.777***  
       (-9.16)  
Period 
   
-0.00789* -0.392*** -0.388*** -0.104***  
    
(-1.78) (-13.01) (-12.88) (-7.18)  
Market-to-book 0.0997*** 
  




(13.35) (12.97) (12.97) (13.33)  
Cash 0.0432*** 
  




(9.57) (10.07) (10.11) (8.10)  
Asset -0.142*** 
  




(-11.43) (-11.40) (-11.32) (-11.56)  
Sale 0.129*** 
  




(11.34) (11.08) (11.02) (11.85)  
Leverage -0.648*** 
  




(-21.20) (-21.25) (-21.47) (-21.19)  
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fixed Effect-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of Obs. 61063 61063 61063 61063 61063 61063 61063  
Adjusted R
2 
 0.0890 0.0141 0.0215 0.0910 0.103 0.107 0.0928  
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Table 2.4 Real Estate Risk and Corporate Investment during the subprime crisis  
This table presents the results on real estate risk and corporate investment level during the financial crisis. The dependent variable 
is corporate investment level scaled by PPE in the observation year. The independent variables are firm level real estate risk 
exposure, the real estate risk, market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and sale. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses. 
         Y= log (CAPEX/PPE): Subsample 2007-2009 
























(-2.36)    
RE value 
     
-0.246   
      
(-0.70)   
Market-to-book 0.0984*** 
  




(7.37) (7.53) (8.66)   
Cash 0.0539*** 
  




(4.48) (5.18) (5.03)   
Asset -0.0876*** 
  




(-2.63) (-2.61) (-2.42)   
Sale 0.0748** 
  




(2.56) (2.38) (2.56)   
Leverage -0.591*** 
  




(-8.06) (-8.29) (-8.18)   
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
No. of Obs. 6913 6913 6913 6913 6913 6913   
Adjusted R
2 




Table 2.5 Real Estate Risk and Long Term Debt Issuance 
This table presents the results on real estate risk and long term debt issuance. The dependent variable is firm’s long term debt 
issuance in the observation year. The independent variables are firm level real estate risk exposure, the real estate risk, market-to-
book ratio, cash, leverage and sale. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses. 
 
  Log(long-term debt issued in amount) Log(Changes in Long Term Debt balance) 





























period 1.066*** 0.241*** 0.550*** 0.813*** 0.561*** 0.685*** 
 
(22.40) (2.96) (6.44) (14.71) (4.28) (5.25) 
Market-to-book 0.0435** 0.0317 0.0383* 0.0526** 0.0383* 0.0460** 
 
(2.14) (1.62) (1.92) (2.54) (1.93) (2.27) 
Leverage 3.941*** 3.977*** 3.926*** 4.813*** 4.876*** 4.799*** 
 
(31.15) (31.71) (31.24) (36.25) (37.01) (36.28) 
Profit 4.376*** 4.422*** 4.403*** 4.241*** 4.307*** 4.298*** 
 
(24.80) (25.46) (25.23) (19.26) (19.56) (19.56) 
Tangible Asset 0.959*** 1.053*** 1.059*** 0.997*** 1.061*** 1.037*** 
 
(7.15) (7.88) (7.81) (7.41) (7.93) (7.65) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 33,861 33,861 33,861 20,926 20,926 20,926 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.218 0.243 0.239 0.242 0.261 0.256 
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Table 2.6 Real Estate Factor and Probability of Equity Issuance 
This table presents the results on real estate risk and equity issuance. The 
dependent variable is the equity issuance dummy in the observation year. The 
independent variables are firm level real estate risk exposure, the real estate 
risk, market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and sale. *, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are included 
in parentheses. 
 
Equity Issuance Dummy 






















   
-0.00295***  
    
(-5.41)  
Cash 0.210*** 0.165*** 0.208*** 0.215***  
 
(18.04) (15.25) (17.86) (18.30)  
Market-to-book 0.0457*** 0.0113 0.0444*** 0.0469***  
 
(3.94) (1.27) (3.88) (4.05)  
Profit -1.694*** -1.397*** -1.673*** -1.854***  
 
(-12.91) (-11.46) (-12.80) (-13.86)  
Sale 0.0575*** 0.0434*** 0.0562*** 0.107***  
 
(4.35) (3.52) (4.25) (7.59)  
Leverage -0.610*** -0.231*** -0.586*** -0.563***  
 
(-7.82) (-3.05) (-7.50) (-7.20)  
Period 5.743*** 4.896*** 5.730*** 7.043***  
 (17.22) (14.71) (17.18) (7.99)  
     
 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
    
 
No. of Obs. 60004 60004 60004 60004  





Table 2.7 Real Estate Factor and Net Equity Issuance 
This table presents the results on real estate risk and net equity issuance. The 
dependent variable is the net equity issuance amount in the observation year. 
The independent variables are firm level real estate risk exposure, the real 
estate risk, market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and sale. *, ** and *** 
represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses. 
Log(Equity Issuance Amount) 














Cash 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.392*** 
 
(23.86) (23.93) (23.92) 
Market-to-book 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 
 
(9.53) (9.51) (9.54) 
Profit -0.327*** -0.328*** -0.307*** 
 
(-2.74) (-2.77) (-2.58) 
Sale 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.469*** 
 
(22.25) (22.31) (22.56) 
Leverage -0.0854 -0.0817 -0.0570 
 
(-0.89) (-0.86) (-0.60) 
    Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-year Yes Yes Yes 
 
   No. of Obs. 24481 24481 24481 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.441 0.447 0.442 




Table 2.8 Real Estate Factor and Capital Structure 
This table presents the results on real estate risk and capital structure. The dependent variable 
is the book leverage and its change in the observation year. The independent variables are 
firm level real estate exposure, the real estate risk, market-to-book ratio, cash, leverage and 
sale. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-
statistics are included in parentheses. 
 
Leverage Change in Leverage 


















Market-to-book -0.0183*** -0.0179*** -0.0171*** -0.0164*** 
 
(-12.99) (-13.10) (-11.46) (-11.32) 
Cash -0.0446*** -0.0440*** -0.0408*** -0.0400*** 
 
(-33.86) (-33.45) (-29.99) (-29.53) 
Sale 0.00616** 0.00540* 0.00555* 0.00471* 
 
(2.20) (1.93) (1.95) (1.66) 
Profit -0.197*** -0.198*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
 
(-16.96) (-17.13) (-10.83) (-11.14) 
Tangible Asset 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 
 
(14.96) (15.01) (13.60) (13.63) 
    
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect-year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of Obs. 62022 62022 55681 55681 
Adjusted R
2 




CHAPTER 3 REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, LIQUIDITY AND 
REITS SEO DYNAMICS 
 
 
The empirical corporate finance literature claims that information asymmetries 
would induce market frictions, which reduce the liquidity of the firm’s 
securities. However, real activities manipulation may reduce the concern given 
its cash flow consequences. Using REITs as a unique laboratory, I show that 
managers engage in real earnings management to attract more uninformed 
trading in order to provide the liquidity services at lower cost during seasoned 
equity offerings. I find less liquid firms are more likely to manipulate earnings 
prior equity offerings and uninformed trading is higher following the real 
earnings management. Firms set the offer price at a smaller discount after 
engaging in real earnings management and stock returns decline in the long 
run. The findings are consistent with real option and liquidity explanations for 
equity offerings. 
 
Keywords: Real estate investment trusts, liquidity risk, real earnings 







A long-standing research question in accounting and finance literature is how 
financial transparency impacts individual firms. Managerial discretion over 
accounting choices and business practices render the potential possibilities for 
managers to manipulate earnings to disguise real corporate performance, i.e. 
earnings management. Previous studies suggest that such information 
asymmetries would induce frictions between sellers and buyers, which reduce 
the liquidity of the firm’s securities. This reduction in liquidity is unwanted for 
firms either with large growth opportunities or who are unable to fund 
corporate investment internally, since those firms will face an increased cost 
of capital when resorting to external financing(Ng 2011). 
If informational asymmetries create economic disadvantages for firms, a key 
question is why firms do not disclose all relevant private information to the 
marketplace and even distort earnings when conducting equity offerings. The 
evidence of the accrual based earnings management around seasoned equity 
offerings (DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2004; Rangan 1998; Teoh, Welch 
and Wong 1998) suggest that firms distort earnings report to inflate the share 
prices to benefit existing shareholders at the expense of potential shareholders. 
This could serve as one plausible explanation. However, recent observations 
show that SEO firms are found to engage in real earnings management during 
seasoned equity offerings and the decline in post-SEO firm performance is 
more severe compared to accrual manipulation(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
The finding is intriguing. Since real earnings management activities could 
distort the information quality to inflate prices like accrual-based earnings 
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management, their direct cash flow consequences could affect the stock 
volatility and liquidity, thus impact stock prices. The relationship among 
information transparency, stock liquidity and cost of equity is unclear in this 
regard.  
The focus of my analysis is seasoned equity issuance of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs). Created in United States, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), offer individuals the opportunities to invest in real properties. 
The tax-exempt feature of REITs requires REITs to distribute a minimum 90% 
of their taxable income to investors as dividends, limiting the possibility of 
free cash flow. Restricted investment options on real estate assets, REIT 
managers’ cannot simply boost their compensation through activities like 
merger and acquisitions and also the dual performance measurement by net 
income and funds from operation limits agency problems. In such a relative 
transparent industry like REITs, REITs managers are inclined to engage in real 
earnings management activities over accrual based manipulation. Ambrose 
and Bian (2010) indicate that REITs firms that are suspected of earnings 
management do not seem to be more mispriced than the non-suspected firms, 
and the information seems to drive the negative earnings management. 
Moreover, since REITs with less cash flow from operations are less probable 
to external financing, their inclination to real earnings management is higher 
compared to general firms.  
In this paper, I examine the impact of real earnings management activities on 
the REITs SEO process to explore the potential linkages among information 
transparency, stock liquidity and equity offerings.  Corporate finance literature 
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suggests that firms time seasoned equity offerings either by selling the 
overpriced shares (window of opportunity/behavioural hypothesis) or by 
exploiting the time-varying risk to minimize the cost of equity (the risk-trade 
off hypothesis). Eckbo and Norli (2005) examine the risk factor associated 
with stock returns around seasoned equity offerings, concluding that liquidity 
risk also determines post-SEO stock returns. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2010) document that “most issuers would have run out of cash by the year 
after the SEO had they not received the offer proceeds”. Lin and Wu (2010) 
also find a decrease in liquidity risk prior to SEO filing help to reduce firms’ 
cost of equity.    
Particularly, I apply a recently developed liquidity-augmented asset pricing 
model to measure the liquidity risk and market risk for REITs. I focus on 
REITs’ exposures to liquidity risk and market risk in relation to the level of 
real earnings management around SEO to (1) test the role of real earnings 
management in REITs SEO timing, and (2) examine whether real earnings 
management will play a role in SEO firms’ stock price dynamics. 
I find that REITs managers engage in real earnings management to attract 
more uninformed trading in order to provide the liquidity services at lower 
cost during seasoned equity offerings. Less liquid firms are more likely to 
manipulate earnings prior equity offerings, and uninformed trading is higher 
following the real earnings management. REITs set the offer price at a smaller 
discount after engaging in real earnings management and stock returns decline 
in the long run. 
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Contribution of this paper is manifold. First, I contribute to the REITs 
seasoned equity issuance literature by providing evidence that real earnings 
management influences REITs equity offering decision, supporting the notion 
that managers distort the earnings to time the market. Second, I contribute to 
the determinants of SEO discounting and underpricing by providing another 
important determinant - real earnings management. Third, I contribute to 
accounting literature by providing another setting where real earnings 
management plays a nontrivial role in market timing and price formation. 
Finally, this paper provides the empirical evidence on real earnings 
management and stock liquidity, supporting recent debates on information 
quality and liquidity risk. 
This paper proceeds as follows. I review the relevant literature in Section II 
and construct the hypotheses in Section III. Section IV describes the data. 
Section V discusses the empirical results. Section VI presents the robustness 
test. Section VII concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Real Earnings Management 
Real earning management happens when managers disguise real economic 
performance by taking real economic actions. In Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005)’s survey on more than 400 executives of U.S. firms, 
managers are willing to sacrifice small economic value for meeting earnings 
targets. Strong evidence is reported that managers take real economic actions, 
like decreasing discretionary expenditures to burn real cash flow for a desired 
reported earnings (Bartov 1993; Roychowdhury 2006). Real earnings 
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management masks a firm’s current unbiased economic performance, and may 
endanger a firm’s competitiveness in the long term (Wang and D'Souza 2006; 
Zang 2007). Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real earnings 
management could negatively impact on the level of future net cash flows and 
increase the volatility. Gunny (2010) tests the consequences of real earning 
management activities and results show that reported income increases 
through real earnings management activities. By reducing research and 
development (R&D) expenses for instance, real earnings management 
negatively impacts on the firm’s future operating performance(Cohen, Dey 
and Lys 2008).  
It is hard for outsiders to distinguish the suboptimal decisions from the optimal. 
After Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) imposed more stringent reporting standards, 
firms started to switch from accrual-based earnings management to real 
earnings management methods. Though real earnings management costs 
higher (Roychowdhury 2006), it is more opaque and more difficult for 
outsiders to detect (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2007). Later, Lobo, Zhang 
and Zhou (2008) confirm the time pattern of manager’s preference on 
alternatives of earning management and indicate that the decrease in accruals 
earning management was smaller at firms with better corporate governance. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, in Mizik and Jacobson (2007)’s test around a 
seasoned equity offering, financial markets overvalue the firms’ engaging in 
earnings inflation linked to real activity manipulation.  
In REITs, real earnings management is a sparsely explored topic. Edelstein, 
Gao and Tsang (2013) document that REITs engage in significant real 
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activities manipulation, which, however, are constrained by the effect of 
corporate governance. Edelstein, Liu and Tsang (2009) indicate that REITs 
may employ real earnings management when confronting a constrained 
capability for meeting their legal dividend payout requirements. They find that 
these firms are more likely to reduce the taxable income and thus the required 
dividend payment, by deferring the recognition of revenue and by incurring 
expenses sooner. They further find that REITs which can generate less cash 
flow from operations and which have fewer opportunities to obtain external 
funding are more likely to engage in real earnings management. Ambrose and 
Bian (2010) investigate whether information generated from stock market 
trading influences managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management in 
REITs and whether investors can anticipate earnings management. Their 
findings imply real earnings management is utilized to affect equity stock 
pricing.  
3.2.2 REITs Seasoned Equity Offerings 
The literature on REITs seasoned equity offerings is well established. There is 
a large literature providing estimates of the market reaction to security issue 
announcements. Like general stocks, a significant negative reaction is 
identified under the implication of Myers and Majluf (1984). Using REITs 
data from 1970 to 1985, Howe and Shilling (1988) document a negative stock 
price reaction to equity offerings and a positive stock price reaction to debt 
offerings. Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (1999) report a significant negative market 
reaction using REITs equity offering in 1990s.  
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Another strand of literature on REITs seasoned equity offerings is concerned 
with capital structure changes. Since the trade-off and pecking order rationales 
are almost silent due to REITs unique characteristics, previous literature on 
REIT capital structure largely focuses on the signaling effects of equity and 
debt offerings of REITs (Howe and Shilling, 1988; Brown and Riddiough, 
2003). Recent empirical results show that REITs time market within a general 
targeted debt ratio environment. Ooi, Ong and Li (2010) examine the public 
offerings timing attempts in REITs and targeted debt ratios. They point out 
that REITs time market within a general targeted debt ratio environment. 
Studies by Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) and Ghosh, Roark and Sirmans 
(2011)  also recorded strong evidence supporting the market timing theory in 
explaining the issuance decisions of REITs.  
However, limited studies are conducted on REITs SEO pricing. Ghosh, Nag 
and Sirmans (2000) document that the significant REITs SEO underpricing is 
related with institutional ownership, issue size, and underwriter reputation. 
Goodwin (2011) further argues that when there is high placement cost and 
value uncertainty with new REITs shares, investors will ask for a greater 
discounting. Short-selling and IPO returns indicate the strong evidence for 
behavioral trading in REITs market (Blau, Hill and Wang 2011). Surprisingly, 
there is no work relating real earnings management to REITs seasoned equity 
issuance and its pricing process. 
Much has been done in the areas of seasoned equity offerings, but questions 
remain. Recent research indicates that equity issuers often exercise large real 
investment options around equity offering, suggesting endogenous corporate 
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investment/financing decision determined by firm’s asset in place. Since 
firm’s real earnings management activities distort the firm cash flow, this 
would be interesting to ask how real earnings manipulation will affect the 
corporate financing decisions like seasoned equity offerings or how this will 
contribute to the expect stock returns. 
3.2.3  Liquidity Risk  
Liquidity risk is defined in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)as a stock’s return 
sensitivity to unexpected market liquidity changes. Empirical evidence 
supports for the pricing of liquidity risk, including the work of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Sadka (2006). Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) incorporate their concept of liquidity into empirical test 
by estimating the correlation of a firm’s stock return to aggregate liquidity 
(liquidity beta). Acharya and Pedersen (2005) further address four possible 
types of systematic risk between a firm and the market in return and liquidity. 
And several studies highlight the difference between liquidity risk and 
liquidity (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Korajczyk and Sadka 2008; Lou and 
Sadka ; Sadka 2011).The liquidity risk of a particular stock is viewed as the 
stock return sensitivity to unexpected changes in market liquidity. However, 
the liquidity means the ability to trade large quantities at low cost and 
efficiently.  
As discussed in the introduction, this study is largely motivated by Lambert, 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2007)’s theoretical work on the effect of information 
quality on market risk. Since real earnings management distorts firm’s 
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information quality, the substantial effect of information quality on cost of 
capital through liquidity might be significant. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
Literature suggests that illiquid firms face an increased cost of capital when 
seeking external financing. Therefore, less liquid firms are more likely to 
increase its stock liquidity prior external financings to reduce the liquidity 
service cost.  Since real earnings manipulations have direct cash flow 
consequences as well as distort information quality, my first objective is to 
examine whether there exists any relation between real earnings management 
and stock liquidity, i.e. whether firms adopt real earnings management to 
increase its stock liquidity. Ng (2011) evidence there exists a negative relation 
between information quality and liquidity risk. Since a higher level of real 
earnings management indicates lower information quality, therefore, my first 
hypothesis is  
Hypothesis1 The decision by REITs to manage earnings via real activities 
manipulation is associated with its risk profile (pre-liquidity risk and pre-
market risk).  
My second objective is to analyze the economic impact of real earnings 
management. If certain firms manage earnings via real activities to increase 
their stock liquidity, this will result in a higher stock liquidity and an 
increasing presence of institutional investors. All these could attract more 




Hypothesis2 Pre-SEO abnormal trading is positively related with real earning 
management prior SEO. 
Last but not the least, my third objective is to examine the impact of real 
earnings management on the subsequent stock performance.  
Market timing theories argues that firms time seasoned equity offerings either 
by selling the overpriced shares (window of opportunity/behavioural 
hypothesis) or by exploiting the time-varying risk to minimize the cost of 
equity (the risk-trade off hypothesis). In the light of real earnings management, 
the manager invests inefficiently by engaging in real earnings management 
activities (exercising the investment option too early) in order to fool the 
investors into overvaluing the project’s NPV before seasoned equity issuance. 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis3 Pre-SEO price mispricing is positively related with real earning 
management prior SEO. 
Should real earnings management be attributable to good pre-filing stock 
performance, SEO firms with real earnings management will be less prone to 
market liquidity shocks. Investors will require a lower liquidity risk premium 
at and after the SEOs. Firms could set the offer price as a lower discount in 
line with liquidity service cost (floatation) reduction. Meanwhile, as point out 
in Hypothesis 1, the higher betas would make firms more inclined to real 
earnings management, which would further increase the risk. Hence, the 
impact of real earnings management on offer price becomes an empirical 
question. Therefore, I hypothesize 
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Hypothesis4 (A) SEO discounting is negatively related with the level of real 
earnings management prior SEO. 
Hypothesis4 (B) SEO discounting is positively related with the level of real 
earnings management prior SEO. 
However, real earnings management masks a firm’s current unbiased 
economic performance, and may endanger a firm’s competitiveness in the 
long term. SEO firms are also found to engage in real earnings management 
during seasoned equity offerings and the decline in post-SEO operating 
performance is more severe compared to accrual manipulation(Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). Hence, 
Hypothesis5 Post-SEO long run return is negatively related with the level of 
real earnings management prior SEO. 
3.1 Data and Sample Description 
I analyze the SEOs conducted by equity REITs during January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2011, reported in SDC database. The study period begins from 
2000, since real earnings management activity is found to increase over 
accrual based earnings management in the recent decade. I further restrict the 
sample to 1) common share offerings 2) listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or Amex, 
3) nonmissing values on Compustat and CRSP. This finally generates 508 
seasonal equity offerings.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the REITs SEO sample. 
Panel A summarizes the issuers’ characteristics. The SEO firms in the sample 
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tend to have higher market to book value. This is expected, since firms tend to 
issue equity when their market valuations are overvalued. Panel B and Panel C 
present the SEO activities of REITs sector during the study period. Since the 
market suffered from a downturn and bottomed out in 2000, fewer SEOs were 
issued in early 2000. After 2001, REITs SEO activities revived and steadily 
increased onwards. 
[Insert Table 3.1] 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Real Earnings Management Measure 
I follow prior studies to construct the proxies for real earnings management 
(Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008; Kim, Lisic, Myers and Pevzner 2011; 
Roychowdhury 2006). I focus on the following three types of real earnings 
management activities.
3
   
1. Timing the revenue recognition through cash flow from operations CFO. 
2. Timing the recognition of the cost of goods sold COGS (i.e. property 
operating expenses for REITs). 
3. Timing the property disposition. 
I first estimate the normal level of CFO, property operating expenses and 
assets disposition by using the models implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). 
I express normal level of CFO as a linear function of sales in the last period 
and change in revenue in the last period. I estimate the following function by 
each year. 
                                                            
3 There are other alternative real earnings management tools such as changing discretionary 
expenses including advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses. However, they are not available 
to real estate firms. 
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(5) 
Abnormal CFO (ABCFO) is the actual CFO minus the CFO estimated using 
the model.  
I next model the property operating expenses as a linear function of 
contemporaneous revenue. 
      
           
   
 
           
   
     
           
       
     
           
                    
(6) 
D is a dummy variable if revenue decreases compared with its last period. 
Abnormal cost of goods sold (ABEXP) is the actual property operating 
expenses Xopr minus the Xopr estimated using the model. 
For normal level of asset disposition, I model it as a linear function of market 
capitalization, fixed asset sales and capital expenditure. 
      
           
   
 
           
         
        
           
   
      
           
                                                                                                                                         
(7) 
Abnormal property disposition (ABDISP) is Gain/Loss from the Sale of 
Property, Plant and Equipment and Investments minus the Gain/Loss 
estimated using the model. 
All data used in the regressions are retrieved from COMPUSTAT, where      
is the cash flow from operation,        is the total book value,     is the total 
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revenue,      is the revenue growth, Xopr is the actual property operating 
expenses, GAIN is the gain from assets sales and income from assets sales/ 
disposition, MV is the market value, Q is Tobin-Q, ASALES is long-lived 
assets sales, and CAPX is long-lived investment sales.  
I use abnormal CFO (ABCFO),   abnormal cost of goods sold (ABEXP) and 
abnormal property disposition (ABDISP) as proxies for real earnings 
management in this paper. Given sales levels, REITs that manage earnings 
upwards are likely to have unusually low cash flow from operations, unusually 
high property operating expenses, and/or unusually low gain (even loss) from 
assets sales and income from assets sales/ disposition (Cohen and Zarowin 
2010). 
3.4.2 Liquidity-augmented CAPM 
In a liquidity-augmented CAPM, the risk premium on stock i can be expressed 
as 
)(])([)( ,,,,,, ttliqtftmtmtfti LIQErRErRE                                                    
(8) 
Where )( ,tmRE  is the expected return of the market portfolio, )( tLIQE is the 
expected value of the mimicking liquidity factor(Pástor and Stambaugh 2003), 
tm, and tliq,  are firm i’s market beta and liquidity beta, respectively.  
To reflect the risk profile of each REIT, I calculate firm’s betas prior SEO by 
regressing their past 36 month returns on market and liquidity factors obtained 
from WRDS website. Observations with less than 12 months return data in 
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their prior 36 months are excluded. In the primary results, I use the liquidity 
factor developed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) to estimate firm’s pre-betas. 
For robustness check, I use the factors developed in Sadka (2006), which are 
based on the transitory-fixed and permanent-variable components of price 
impact. 
3.4.3 Pre-SEO Misvaluation 
To examine the impact of real earnings management on misvaluation before 
SEO, I decompose pre-issue market-to-book (m-b) ratios into misvaluation 
(m-v) and growth opportunities (v-b) following the methodology developed by 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) (RKRV, thereafter), and 
utilized in several recent papers (Fu, Lin and Officer 2010; Hertzel and Li 
2010; Hoberg and Phillips 2010) . 
If investors overestimate the future cash flows or underestimate risks, market-
to-value will capture the mispricing component of the market-to-book ratio. 
RKRV methodology estimates the firm value v by estimating both industry 
level accounting multiples and long run firm accounting multiples using the 
following equation. 
itjitjitjtitjtitititit bvvvvmbm  );();();();(                              
(9) 
The first component 
);( jtitit vm   measures the difference between market 
value and fundamental value estimated using firm-specific accounting data 
and the contemporaneous industry accounting multiples. This component is 
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the mispricing proxy I use in this paper. The third component itjit
bv );( 
 
captures the growth opportunities.  
To empirically separate mispricing component, RKRV (2005) adopt three 
different models to estimate firm value. I adopt RKRV’s 3rd model to estimate 
the market value as follows
4
: 




4)0(3210 )ln()ln(                    
(10)     
Where m is market value of equity, b is a book value of equity, 
itNI )ln(  is the 
natural logarithm of positive net income, I is an indicator function for negative 
net income observations, and LEV  is leverage ratio.  
To calculate the REITs industry wide accounting multiples, I run cross-
sectional regressions for the REITs industry to obtain the estimated REITs 
industry accounting multiples jt
ˆ
for each year t.  
Hence, the estimated firm value is obtained in the following equation. 
itjtitjtitjtjtjtjtjtjtititit LEVNIIbLEVNIbv 3)0(2103210 ˆ)ln(ˆˆˆ)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ;,,(  

                     
(11) 
                                                            
4 The 1st model includes book value and the 2nd model includes net income in addition to book 
value. Our results remain robust to either of these models. RKRV provides a detailed 
discussion of the rationale behind these models. 
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The difference between market value it
m
 prior to SEO issuance and the 
estimated firm value 
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ;,,( 3210 jtjtjtjtititit LEVNIbv   is the proxy for 
stock mispricing. 
3.4.4 Control Variables 
I control for other determinants of SEO issuance and its price dynamics that 
have been documented in prior studies. 
I include a set of control variables for firms’ characteristics. I use the nature 
logarithm of firm’s market capitalization (Size) to control for firm size. I also 
include REITs growth level (Growth), percentage change of total assets from 
last period. I calculate firms’ market-to-book ratio (logMB) as the logarithm of 
firms’ market value divided by its book value in the most recent quarter.  Cash 
and short-term investment (Cash) and return on assets (ROA) are applied to 
control firm’s financial slack. 
The second set of control variables included are the SEO characteristics. 
Uranking is the underwriter reputation(Carter and Manaster 1990; Safieddine 
and Wilhelm Jr 1996). SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence 
regarding the REIT itself to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO 
(Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans 2000). Age is the number of years between the SEO 
year and the IPO year to measure the stage in firm life cycle as suggested in 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 2010).  
Lastly, I include variables for alternative explanations. Information asymmetry 
(InfoAs) is the abnormal return around earning announcement releases (Lowry, 
2003). Investors’ sentiment is also included to control for the possibility that 
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managers issue equities when investors are over-optimistic. Investors’ 
sentiment index is constructed from University of Michigan’s Consumer 
Sentiment Index, using the methodology described in Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006). 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Empirical Evidence of Real Earnings Management 
Figure 3.1 descripts the average level of real earnings management activities 
in the SEO year and the years immediately preceding and following it using 
quarterly data. REITs that conduct SEOs generally exhibit unusually low cash 
flow from operations (negative), higher property operating expenses, and 
unusually low gain (negative) from assets sales and income from assets sales/ 
disposition prior issuance. Real earnings management activities increase 
significantly prior issuance and decline post issuance. 
[Insert Figure 3.1] 
I also report the average level of real earnings management activities of non-
SEO REITs in the match period. Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I 
find significant negative abnormal CFO and positive abnormal property 
operating expenses in the SEO year for REITs. And most importantly, I also 
find negative gains (loss) from abnormal assets sales and income from assets 
sales/ disposition in the SEO year for REITs, which has not been found in the 
study of general firms. 
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3.5.2 Determinants of Real Earnings Management  
Unlike accrual earnings management, real earnings manipulations have direct 
cash flow consequences and could affect the stock volatility, thus impact stock 
prices. Ng (2011) evidence a negative relation between information quality 
and liquidity risk, which results in a reduction in the cost of equity. I analyze 
the determinants of real earnings management around SEO issuance in the 
following multivariate model. 
  TimeControlsbetaMktbetaLiqREM jtjtjtjt __ 210                              
(12) 
Liquidity beta and market beta are calculated by regressing their past 36 
month returns on market and liquidity factors using Liquidity Augmented 
CAPM model. The liquidity factor used is developed by Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) (WRDS website). Observations with less than 12 months 
return data in their previous 36 months are excluded.  
Table 3.2 shows the determinants of real earnings management around SEOs. 
The coefficients for both liquidity risk and market risk are all with predicted 
signs and significant for the three real earnings management proxies. This 
indicates that REITs managers take the market risk and stock liquidity risk 
into consideration when they choose to manage earnings via real manipulation 
activities prior SEO. Firms with higher pre-beta, that is, more vulnerable to 
liquidity shocks and market turmoil, are more likely to manipulate their 
earnings via real earnings management activities (lower-than-average 
abnormal CFO, higher-than-average abnormal property operating expenses, 
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and lower-than-average negative gains (loss) from abnormal assets sales and 
income from assets sales/ disposition).  
Table 3.2 also presents the relationship between the real earnings management 
and other variables. The coefficients for cash and short-term investment are 
negative, indicating that REITs are likely to manipulate earnings via timing 
the revenue and asset disposition around SEO when they are financially slack. 
Firm age affects differently across the three real earnings management proxies, 
suggesting that firms adopt different real earnings management tools based on 
their maturity. 
Overall, my findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the decision by 
REITs to manage earnings via real activities manipulation around SEO is 
associated with its risk profile, supporting that REITs exploit the time-varying 
risk when conducting seasoned equity offerings. 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
3.5.3 Uninformed Trading and Real Earnings Management 
As discussed in the previous section, firms with higher liquidity risk are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management activities. My next question is 
why real earnings management?  
If certain firms manage earnings via real activities to increase their stock 
liquidity, this will result in a higher stock liquidity and an increasing presence 
of institutional investors. All these could attract more uninformed trading to 
further increase the liquidity as stated in Hypothesis 2. 
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I then test the impact of real earnings management activities on the investors 
trading activities. Using standard event study method, I calculate abnormal 
trading volume prior SEO.  For each REIT, I use a maximum of 70 daily 
volume observations for the period around its respective SEO, starting at day -
70 and ending at day -1 relative to the event. The first 65 days (three months) 
in this period (-70 through -5) is designated the ‘estimation period’, and the 
following 5 days (-5 through -1) is designated the ‘event period’. The 
abnormal trading volume5 prior SEO is estimated as 






 are average trading volume for REIT  j during the event 
period and the estimation period, respectively.  
I analyze the impact of real earnings management around SEO issuance on 
uninformed trading in the following multivariate model. 
  TimeControlsREMAV jtjtjt 10                                                              
(14) 
where REM are the proxies for real earnings management.      
Table 3 documents that the level of real earnings management is positive 
related with the uninformed trading in the market. The coefficients the three 
real earnings management proxies are with predicted signs and significant, 
                                                            
5 In robustness test, I measure the abnormal trading volume using 22 days (one month), 44 
days (two months) prior to SEO as the event period. A difference-in-difference analysis is also 
performed based on REITs pre-SEO liquidity. 
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indicating that less liquid firms are more likely to manipulate earnings prior 
equity offerings and uninformed trading is higher following the real earnings 
management. Increased uninformed trading will reduce the liquidity costs 
during seasoned equity offerings, which is exactly wanted by illiquid firms.  
[Insert Table 3.3] 
3.5.4 Real Earnings Management and SEO Price Dynamics 
3.5.4.1 Pre SEO Stock Valuation 
Based on the discussion in section 3.3, Hypothesis 1 predicts that pre-SEO 
stock mispricing is positively related with the level of real earnings 
management, since the REITs managers are induced to invest inefficiently by 
engaging in real earnings management activities to attempt to fool the market 
into overestimating the project’s NPV before seasoned equity issuance. As 
described in the previous section, I adopt RKRV methodology to calculate the 
mispricing (PreMis) using firm stock closing price the day prior to SEO 
issuance. I analyze the relation between real earnings management and pre-
issuance mispricing of SEO firms in the following multivariate model. 
  TimeControlsREMeMis jtjtjt 10Pr                                                         
(15) 
 REM are the three proxies for real earnings management.  
    
Table 3.4 shows the results. The coefficients for real earnings management 
proxies are all significant with predicted signs. Real earnings management 
activities deviate stock price from the fundamental value, showing that 
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managers manipulate earnings to issue the equity at the expense of potential 
investors. The mispricing story hinges on the motivation for managers to take 
advantage of pre-existing exposures to systematic risks (liquidity, market). 
Intuitively, REM could result in additional information about the issuer which 
would information flow and liquidity trading, thereby pushing up stock price. 
Model’s explanatory power (adjusted R square) significantly increases after 
incorporating real earnings management variables. 
I document a negative relationship between mispricing level and information 
asymmetry (InfoAs), but this relationship is insignificant. Mispricing is higher 
for older firms and frequent equity issuers, implying that the market is 
deceived repeatedly by real earnings management activities.  Overall, my 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that pre-SEO stock mispricing is 
positively correlated with the real earnings management activities, lending 
support to the window of opportunity/behavioral hypothesis of seasoned 
equity offerings. 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
3.5.4.2 Real Earnings Management and SEO Discounting 
Next I examine the relationship between the level of real earnings 
management and discounting. I specify the following regression. 




Table 3.5 shows the results. The coefficients for real earnings management 
proxies are all significant with predicted signs. I observe that firms set the 
offer price at a smaller discount after engaging in real earnings management. 
Since Real earnings management should be attributable to good pre-filing 
stock performance, it results in a higher stock liquidity and an increasing 
presence of institutional investors. All these could attract more uninformed 
trading to issuing firms. As a consequence, SEO firms with real earnings 
management are less prone to market liquidity shocks, and investors will 
require a lower liquidity risk premium at and after the SEOs.  
[Insert Table 3.5] 
I am aware that in the sample, there are observations with zero discounting, 
which mean that firm simply sets the offer price at the market price. To 
investigate the impact of real earnings management on this phenomenon, I 
specify the following probit test. 
  TimeControlsREMDisATM jtjtjt 10                                                    
(17) 
DisATM is a binary variable, indicating if the firm sets the offer price at the 
market price. 
Shown from Table 3.6, the coefficients for real earnings management proxies 
are all significant with predicted signs. Firms are more likely to set the offer 




[Insert Table 3.6] 
As for other control variables, sentiment is positively related with SEO 
discounting level, consistent with behavioral explanations for seasoned equity 
offerings. Besides, Loderer, Sheehan and Kadlec (1991) argue that many of 
IPO theories based on asymmetric information can be applied to seasoned 
equity offerings. Corwin (2003) provides analysis of these theories in the 
context of SEOs, whereas Goodwin (2011) examines the information 
asymmetry theories in the context of REIT SEOs. All these theories predict a 
positive relationship between the level of information asymmetry and 
discounting. The positive and significant relation between InfoAs and 
discounting is consistent with this reasoning. This also demonstrates that my 
proxies for real earnings management do not capture the effect of information 
asymmetry. 
Above all, results show that firms set the offer price as a lower discount after 
engaging in real earnings management as a result of liquidity service cost 
(floatation) reduction. 
3.5.4.3 Real Earnings Management and Long-run Stock Return 
Finally, I look at the long run performance after REITs equity offerings. I 
define long-run abnormal return as SEO risk adjusted return for 3, 6, and 12 
months using Fama-French four factor model. 




R ,   is the REIT’s rate of return, tf
r ,  is the risk-free return rate, tm
R ,  is 
the return of the stock market, SMB stands for return of "small minus big" 
portfolio, HML stands for return on "high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market" portfolio, and UMD stands for  momentum factor (MOM), which is 
long prior-month winners and short prior-month losers. 
Since real earnings management activities disguise firm’s performance and 
intend to fool the investors, I expect to observe lower long-run 
underperformance after seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter 1995) 
as real earnings management deviates firm from optimal business practice. 
I specify a following multivariate regression to test the impact of real earnings 
management on long run returns.  
  tjtjtjt TimeControlsREMLret 10                                                                 
(19) 
Shown in Table 3.7, stock returns decline in the long run with the level of real 
earnings management, consistent with previous findings on post-SEO 
underperformance on operating (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Since the level of 
mispricing is greater for older and frequent equity issuers as found in the 
previous analysis, the underperformance of stock return in the long run lines 
up with the concept that the post-SEO price corrects price based on how much 
real earnings management took place prior to the SEO. 
Furthermore, model’s explanatory power (adjusted R square) increases after 
incorporating real earnings management variables.    
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[Insert Table 3.7] 
 
3.6 Robustness Test 
I am mindful that the equity issuance clustering effect might bias the estimates. 
I address this issue by clustering error terms (Petersen 2009).  I estimate the 
models after clustering standard errors in unreported analysis.  
For the key variables measurement, I include industry-based real earnings 
management proxies, calculated as the difference in each measure between the 
REIT and its industry average. I also estimate the liquidity risk loadings by 
using the factors developed in Sadka (2006), which are based on the 
transitory-fixed and permanent-variable components of price impact. As for 
the abnormal trading volume, I measure the abnormal trading volume using 22 
days (one month), 44 days (two months) prior to SEO as the event period in 
the unreported analysis. And the result remains significant and robust. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
The evidence of accrual based earnings management around seasoned equity 
offerings (DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2004; Rangan 1998; Teoh, Wong 
and Rao 1998) suggest that firms distort earnings report to inflate the share 
prices. Meanwhile, SEO firms are also found to engage in real earnings 
management during seasoned equity offerings and the decline in post-SEO 
firm performance is more severe compared to accrual manipulation (Cohen 
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and Zarowin 2010). The finding is intriguing, since while real earnings 
management activities could distort the information quality to inflate prices 
like accrual-based earnings management, real earnings manipulations also 
have direct cash flow consequences and could affect the stock volatility, thus 
impact stock prices. However, there is no study examining how real earnings 
management affect the stock return and cost of equity around seasoned equity 
offering. My research fills the gap. 
In this paper, I examine the impact of real earnings management activities on 
the REITs SEO process to revisit the window of opportunity and risk-return 
trade-off hypotheses debated in the literature. Given the high dividend payout 
feature and restricted investment options on real estate assets, REITs managers 
are inclined to engage in real earnings management activities over accrual 
based manipulation compared to general firms. Particularly, I apply a recently 
developed liquidity-augmented asset pricing model to measure the liquidity 
risk and market risk for SEO firms. I focus on firms' exposures to liquidity risk 
and market risk in relation to the level of real earnings management around 
SEO to (1) test the role of real earnings management in SEO timing, and (2) 
examine whether real earnings management will impact SEO firms' stock 
return. 
I find that REITs managers engage in real earnings management to attract 
more uninformed trading in order to provide the liquidity services at lower 
cost during seasoned equity offerings. I find less liquid firms are more likely 
to manipulate earnings prior equity offerings and uninformed trading is higher 
following the real earnings management. Firms set the offer price at a smaller 
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discount after engaging in real earnings management and stock returns decline 
in the long run. The findings are consistent with real option and liquidity 
explanations. 
Overall, real earnings management seems to play an important role in REITs 
seasoned equity offerings. Future research will link up property disposition 





Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for REITs firms conducting SEOs during 
2000–2011 
 
Panel A: REITs SEO Characteristics 
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Asset 1935.76 2888.57 3131.39 
Market Capitalization 2398.43 3505.82 3828.08 
Leverage 0.46 0.48 0.16 
Market to Book 1.16 1.21 0.30 
Offer Amount 102.05 165.62 182.48 
    Panel B: Time Distribution   
Year Freq. Percent% Cum.% 
2000 3 0.59 0.59 
2001 29 5.71 6.30 
2002 28 5.51 11.81 
2003 50 9.84 21.65 
2004 47 9.25 30.91 
2005 39 7.68 38.58 
2006 59 11.61 50.20 
2007 25 4.92 55.12 
2008 35 6.89 62.01 
2009 60 11.81 73.82 
2010 69 13.58 87.40 
2011 64 12.60 100.00 
Total 508 
    
Panel C: Property Type Distribution     
 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Diversified 50 9.84 9.84 
Health Care 83 16.34 26.18 
Industrial/Office 116 22.83 49.02 
Lodging/Resorts 69 13.58 62.60 
Residential 46 9.06 71.65 
Retail 118 23.23 94.88 
Self-Storage 9 1.77 96.65 
Specialty 17 3.35 100.00 
Total 508 
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Figure 3.1 Real Earnings Management around REITs SEOs 
Figure 1 descripts the average level and standard deviation of real earnings 
management activities in the SEO year-quarter and the years immediately 
preceding and following it using quarterly data. Proxies for real earnings 
management are measured in acceleration of the timing of sales (abnormal 
sales), decreasing cost (abnormal cost) and abnormal asset disposition. In later 
analysis, I scale down abnormal cost by 10
-1 
and abnormal asset disposition by 
10
-5 
for better explanation. 
Panel A 
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ABCFO -0.09 0.058 -0.11 3.52*** 
ABEXP 0.0055 0.0023 0.0032 3.34*** 















































Table 3.2 Determinants of Real Earnings Management prior SEOs 
This table presents the result of determinants of real earnings management 
around SEOs. Dependent variables are measures for real earnings management 
ABCFO, ABEXP and ABDISP, respectively. Liq_beta and Mkt_beta are 
liquidity beta and market beta estimated using liquidity augmented CAPM, 
respectively. Size is the nature logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. 
Growth is percentage change of total assets from last period. logMB is the 
logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book value in the most recent 
quarter.  Cash is Cash and short-term investment. ROA is return on assets. 
Age is the number of years between the observation year and the IPO year.*, 
** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-
statistics are included in parentheses. 
 
































Cash -0.0169 -0.00711 -0.0405 -0.0739 -0.0379 -0.0553* 
 
(-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.71) (-1.19) (-1.77) 
Size 0. 101 -0. 0394 -0. 424 -0. 357 0.390 0. 457 
 
(0.07) (-0.06) (-1.27) (-1.06) (0.38) (0.45) 
LogMB -0.00120 0.00159 0.000252 0.000714 0.0591 0.0816** 
 
(-0.23) (0.68) (0.21) (0.59) (1.59) (2.25) 
Growth 0.00704 0.0103*** 0.00147 0.00137 -0.0692 -0.0581 
 
(0.89) (2.85) (0.79) (0.73) (-1.20) (-1.03) 
ROA 0.149 0.0167 -0.166*** -0.132*** -7.31*** -6.630*** 
 
(0.84) (0.20) (-3.97) (-3.12) (-5.70) (-5.22) 
Age -0.00037*** -0.000069 -0.000064** -0.00003 0.00112 0.00175* 
 
(-2.88) (-1.08) (-2.09) (-0.92) (1.19) (1.78) 
       Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Obs No, 499 499 499 499 499 499 
Adjusted R2 0.00761 0.0275 0.124 0.150 0.0993 0.161 





Table 3.3 Real Earnings Management and Abnormal Trading Volume 
prior SEO 
This table presents the result of testing the effects of real earnings management on 
abnormal trading volume prior SEO. The dependent variable is abnormal trading 
volume prior SEO, which is calculated using standard event study method. ABCFO, 
ABEXP and ABDISP are the measures for real earnings management. Size is the 
nature logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. Growth is percentage change of total 
assets from last period. logMB is the logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its 
book value in the most recent quarter.  Cash is Cash and short-term investment. ROA 
is return on assets. Uranking is the underwriter reputation. SeqREIT is constructed as 
the current SEO sequence regarding the REIT itself to account for the clustering and 
frequency of SEO. Age is the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO 
year to measure the stage in firm life cycle. InfoAs is the abnormal return around 
earning announcement releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. Sentiment is 
investors’ sentiment index constructed from University of Michigan’s Consumer 
Sentiment Index, using the methodology described in Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006)..*, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
T-statistics are included in parentheses. 
































   
(-4.17) (-4.57) 
Cash  0.0576*** 0.0566*** 0.0565*** 0.0557*** 0.0550*** 
 
 (4.00) (3.95) (3.76) (3.75) (3.79) 
Growth  -0.0870 -0.0683 -0.153 -0.176 -0.132 
 
 (-0.60) (-0.47) (-0.87) (-1.01) (-0.77) 
ROA  0.138 0.0800 0.548 -0.449 0.105 
 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.32) (-0.27) (0.06) 
Age  0.00235 0.00236 0.00380 0.00349 0.00486 
 
 (0.77) (0.78) (1.15) (1.08) (1.52) 
SeqREIT  0.0142** 0.0125** 0.0151** 0.0126* 0.0120* 
 
 (2.31) (2.04) (2.30) (1.94) (1.87) 
Uranking  0.0247 0.0214 0.0349* 0.0288 0.0360** 
 
 (1.44) (1.25) (1.89) (1.59) (2.01) 
InfoAs  1.868*** 1.742*** 1.920*** 1.797*** 1.682*** 
 
 (3.35) (3.13) (3.28) (3.10) (2.96) 
Sentiment  0.0184*** 0.0181*** 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0153*** 
 
 (4.39) (4.33) (3.83) (3.88) (3.60) 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 499 499 499 499 499 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.210 0.218 0.236 0.270 




Table 3.4 Real Earnings Management and PreSEO Valuation 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between stock mispricing 
prior issuance and real earnings management activities. Dependent variable is the 
mispricing level (PreMis) prior SEO issuance. ABCFO, ABEXP and ABDISP are the 
measures for real earnings management. Size is the nature logarithm of firm’s market 
capitalization. Growth is percentage change of total assets from last period. logMB is 
the logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book value in the most recent 
quarter.  Cash is Cash and short-term investment. ROA is return on assets. Uranking 
is the underwriter reputation. SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence 
regarding the REIT itself to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO. Age is 
the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO year to measure the stage in 
firm life cycle. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning announcement releases 
as a proxy for information asymmetry. Sentiment is investors’ sentiment index 
constructed from University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, using the 
methodology described in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)..*, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are included in 
parentheses. 
























   
-3.754*** -2.790** 




0.0237*** 0.0206*** 0.0225*** 0.0237*** 0.0193*** 
  
(3.24) (2.80) (3.07) (3.26) (2.64) 
Growth 
 
-0.0502 -0.0913 -0.0910 -0.0754 -0.154 
  
(-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.20) 
ROA 
 
19.83 19.52 19.23 31.56* 27.59 
  
(1.06) (1.05) (1.03) (1.67) (1.47) 
Age 
 
0.0113 0.00814 0.0122 0.0152 0.0121 
  
(0.71) (0.51) (0.76) (0.96) (0.77) 
SeqREIT 
 
0.132*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 
  
(4.13) (4.08) (4.02) (3.86) (3.75) 
Uranking 
 
-0.0288 -0.0250 -0.0288 -0.0459 -0.0379 
  
(-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.33) (-0.53) (-0.44) 
InfoAs 
 
-3.836 -3.135 -4.246 -4.087 -3.798 
  
(-1.35) (-1.11) (-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.36) 
Sentiment 0.0478** 0.0272 0.0471** 0.0387* 0.0204 
  
(2.23) (1.21) (2.21) (1.81) (0.91) 
Constant 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 499 499 499 499 499 
Adjusted R2 0.0912 0.105 0.0995 0.109 0.127 





Table 3.5 Real Earnings Management and SEO discounting 
This table presents the result of testing the effects of real earnings management on 
SEO discounting. The dependent variable is discounting, which is the percentage 
change in the price between the offer price and the closing price of the day prior SEO 
issuance. ABCFO, ABEXP and ABDISP are the measures for real earnings 
management. Size is the nature logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. Growth is 
percentage change of total assets from last period. logMB is the logarithm of firms’ 
market value divided by its book value in the most recent quarter.  Cash is Cash and 
short-term investment. ROA is return on assets. Uranking is the underwriter 
reputation. SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence regarding the REIT 
itself to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO. Age is the number of years 
between the SEO year and the IPO year to measure the stage in firm life cycle. InfoAs 
is the abnormal return around earning announcement releases as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. Sentiment is investors’ sentiment index constructed from 
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, using the methodology 
described in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)..*, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
























   
0.270*** 0.351*** 
    
(2.70) (3.47) 
Cash -0.0779 -0.0821 -0.0766 -0.0564 -0.0518 
 
(-1.14) (-1.20) (-1.13) (-0.82) (-0.77) 
Growth -0.00871 -0.0107 -0.0118 -0.00840 -0.0135 
 
(-0.69) (-0.84) (-0.94) (-0.67) (-1.09) 
ROA 0.115 0.136 -0.0651 0.183 0.00928 
 
(0.68) (0.80) (-0.37) (1.08) (0.05) 
Age 0.000180 0.000227 0.0000674 0.000175 0.0000781 
 
(0.86) (1.08) (0.32) (0.84) (0.38) 
SeqREIT 0.000713 0.000405 0.000757 0.000829 0.000673 
 
(0.93) (0.52) (1.00) (1.09) (0.89) 
Uranking -0.000389 -0.000236 -0.000348 -0.000463 -0.000316 
 
(-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.22) 
InfoAs 0.108** 0.0958** 0.111** 0.102** 0.0954** 
 
(2.23) (1.98) (2.33) (2.13) (2.02) 
Sentiment 0.000911*** 0.000904*** 0.000901*** 0.00111*** 0.00115*** 
 
(2.83) (2.82) (2.83) (3.37) (3.57) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs No. 508 508 508 508 508 
Adjusted R2 0.0278 0.0373 0.0505 0.0398 0.0782 
F Stat  2.609 2.964 3.699 3.104 4.586 
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Table 3.6 Real Earnings Management and SEO Discounting (Probit 
Model) 
This table presents the result of testing the effects of real earnings management on 
SEO discounting. The dependent variable is binary variable, indicating if the firm sets 
the offer price at the market price.. ABCFO, ABEXP and ABDISP are the measures 
for real earnings management. Size is the nature logarithm of firm’s market 
capitalization. Growth is percentage change of total assets from last period. logMB is 
the logarithm of firms’ market value divided by its book value in the most recent 
quarter.  Cash is Cash and short-term investment. ROA is return on assets. Uranking 
is the underwriter reputation. SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence 
regarding the REIT itself to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO. Age is 
the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO year to measure the stage in 
firm life cycle. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning announcement releases 
as a proxy for information asymmetry. Sentiment is investors’ sentiment index 
constructed from University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, using the 
methodology described in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)..*, ** and *** represents 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are included in 
parentheses. 




















   
-6.645** -6.610** 
    
(-2.06) (-2.04) 
Cash 0.230 0.239 0.522 0.395 0.717 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.21) (0.37) 
Growth 0.266 0.364 0.225 0.233 0.300 
 
(0.75) (1.01) (0.63) (0.66) (0.82) 
ROA -0.301 -2.079 1.621 -2.296 -2.361 
 
(-0.06) (-0.43) (0.33) (-0.47) (-0.46) 
Age -0.000350 -0.0000370 0.000139 -0.0000778 0.000767 
 
(-0.06) (-0.01) (0.02) (-0.01) (0.13) 
SeqREIT 0.0417** 0.0426** 0.0378** 0.0338* 0.0310 
 
(2.18) (2.22) (1.96) (1.73) (1.58) 
Uranking -0.00859 -0.0106 -0.00842 -0.0125 -0.0150 
 
(-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.29) (-0.35) 
InfoAs 0.137 0.143 0.153 0.103 0.0661 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) 
Sentiment 0.0136 0.0141 0.00868 0.0185* 0.0142 
 
(1.47) (1.53) (0.91) (1.94) (1.44) 
Obs No. 508 508 508 508 508 





Table 3.7 Real Earnings Management and SEO Long-run Performance 
This table presents the effects of real earnings management on SEO long run adjusted 
return. The dependent variable is the post SEO adjusted return in 3 month, 6month 
and 12 month ABCFO, ABEXP and ABDISP are the measures for real earnings 
management. Size is the nature logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. Growth is 
percentage change of total assets from last period. logMB is the logarithm of firms’ 
market value divided by its book value in the most recent quarter.  Cash is Cash and 
short-term investment. ROA is return on assets. Uranking is the underwriter 
reputation. SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence regarding the REIT 
itself to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO. Age is the number of years 
between the SEO year and the IPO year to measure the stage in firm life cycle. InfoAs 
is the abnormal return around earning announcement releases as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. Sentiment is investors’ sentiment index constructed from 
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, using the methodology 
described in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)..*, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses. 
Long Run Risk Adjusted Stock Return 
  3 Month 6 Month 12 Month 










































Cash 0.314 0.321* 0.548** 0.544** 0.818** 0.833** 
 
(1.60) (1.65) (2.11) (2.12) (2.33) (2.40) 
Growth -0.0545 -0.0452 -0.0499 -0.0363 -0.110* -0.0939 
 
(-1.48) (-1.25) (-1.03) (-0.76) (-1.67) (-1.45) 
ROA 0.542 0.755 0.196 0.326 0.252 0.461 
 
(1.11) (1.44) (0.30) (0.47) (0.28) (0.48) 
Age 0.00112* 0.000994 0.00172** 0.00162** 0.00203* 0.00190* 
 
(1.83) (1.63) (2.11) (2.01) (1.84) (1.74) 
SeqREIT -0.000474 0.000812 0.000991 0.00281 0.00199 0.00451 
 
(-0.24) (0.41) (0.38) (1.07) (0.56) (1.27) 
Uranking 0.000566 0.000484 -0.00352 -0.00265 0.00162 0.00108 
 
(0.13) (0.11) (-0.62) (-0.45) (0.20) (0.14) 
InfoAs 0.565*** 0.552*** 0.842*** 0.818*** 0.937*** 0.906*** 
 
(4.04) (3.99) (4.54) (4.47) (3.74) (3.66) 
Sentiment -0.0021** -0.0016* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.0035** -0.0026* 
 
(-2.27) (-1.78) (-3.43) (-2.99) (-2.09) (-1.75) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Obs No. 508 508 508 508 508 508 
Adjusted R2 0.0488 0.0794 0.0701 0.102 0.0473 0.0799 





CHAPTER 4 INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND SEO PRICING: 
EVIDENCED FROM REITS 
 
 
Using Real Estate Investment Trusts as a unique laboratory, I investigate the 
impact of investor sentiment on SEO price dynamics. Evidence indicates that 
investor sentiment is positively related with pre-SEO overpricing and 
probability of issuance, but negatively related with announcement returns. 
SEOs issued in high sentiment periods have larger discounts and higher first 
day returns. I also find that high sentiment periods are followed by low long-
run returns, suggesting that sentiment does not proxy for unobservable 
fundamentals. Overall, my findings are consistent with market timing and 
behavioral explanations for equity offerings. 
 








Price dynamics around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) challenge the 
traditional view that stock prices are rationally set. Behavioral models suggest 
that managers will balance the marginal cost from issuing equity with the 
direct market timing gains from over-confident investors and stock mispricing 
(Stein 1996). In this paper, I define investor sentiment as a misguided belief 
about a firm’s risks or future cash flows based on the available 
information(Baker and Wurgler 2006) and examine its impact on the SEO 
pricing process in a particular type of firm: the Real Estate Investments Trust 
(REIT).  
REITs are the ideal setting for my analysis because they have several 
characteristics ideally suited to capture the impact of investor sentiment on 
SEO pricing. First, legislative considerations force a REIT to distribute a 
minimum 90% of their taxable income to investors as dividends (Boudry 
2011), thus limiting the possibility of free cash flow and all but eliminating the 
free cash flow problem suggested by Jensen (1986). Second, restrictions on  
investment options for  real estate assets and regulations on dividend pay-outs  
force REITs to rely primarily on external financing to fund investments; they 
use external financing far more often than  general firms do (Boudry, Kallberg 
and Liu 2011; Ott, Riddiough and Yi 2005). These frequent forays to the 
market result in the disclosure of more information about the firm, and thus 
reduce information asymmetry. Third, REITs are effectively tax-exempt, 
which rules out tax-based theories of capital structure(Boudry, Kallberg and 
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Liu 2011). Fourth, because REITs are highly leveraged in comparison with 
general firms, REIT managers have strong incentives to monitor the equity 
capital market to balance the costs of different types of capital. Thus, REITs' 
seasoned equity issuance decisions and pricing are likely to be market driven, 
which also rules out the pecking order theory of capital structure as another 
potential explanation. Indeed, Ghosh, Roark, and Sirmans (2011) report that 
the deterioration in operating performance of REITs after SEO is largely 
influenced by these firms’ timing behavior. Overall, REIT capital structure is 
more consistent with market timing theory than with traditional capital 
structure theories because  the key drivers behind traditional capital structure 
theories are partially silent in REITs (Ooi, Ong and Li 2010). This alignment 
enables us to circumvent capital structure issues that might contaminate equity 
issuance studies. Finally, REITs are ideal for analyzing the rationality of SEO 
pricing because,  in the real estate market, existing evidence indicates that 
investor sentiment also influences acquisition prices in both private and public 
commercial real estate markets (Ling, Naranjo and Scheick 2013) . 
Recent advances in behavioral finance suggest that investor sentiment 
contributes to stock mispricing. In a seminal paper, Delong, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldamann  (1990) argue that overlapping generations of 
sentiment investors arrive to the market together and trade in the same 
direction. 6  The correlated trading of sentiment investors deters rational 
arbitrageurs and exerts pressure on asset prices, causing them to deviate from 
                                                            
6 See Kumar and Lee (2006) for empirical evidence.  
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fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk.7 The deviation 
from fundamental prices (i.e., overvaluation) is often stated as one of the main 
motives for equity issuance. For example, Graham and Harvey(2001)  report 
that two thirds of CFOs claim that overvaluation is an important or very 
important consideration in the equity issuance decision. In agreement with 
survey evidence, Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) empirically show that equity 
issuance is positively associated with ex ante indicators of overvaluation such 
as market-to-book ratio and market indices. This positive relation between 
equity issuance and its ex ante indicators of overvaluation is hard to reconcile 
with the predictions of trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory of capital 
structure (Myers and Majluf 1984). In addition,  evidence of earnings 
management before equity issuance (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998), post-issue 
long- run underperformance (Loughran and Ritter 1995), and decline in 
operating performance after SEO(Ghosh, Roark and Sirmans 2011; Loughran 
and Ritter 1997) suggest that managers attempt to sell overpriced shares to 
investors if the market permits(Baker and Wurgler 2002). Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) document that the aggregate fraction of equity issues is higher during 
high sentiment periods. Chiu and Kini (2013) find that aggregate equity 
mutual fund flows influence the firm decision to conduct SEOs and initial 
returns, which they interpret it as the impact of investor sentiment. However, 
Howe and Zhang (2010) report an insignificant impact on SEO decisions 
using consumer sentiment index from the Conference Board. 
                                                            
7 Research has shown that investor sentiment contributes to mispricing in stock and options 
markets. For example, Brown and Cliff (2004) provide evidence that market pricing errors are 
positively related to sentiment, and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) argue that investor 
sentiment explains size premium. In the options market, Han (2008) and Lemmon and Ni 




Even though determinants of SEO pricing have been extensively examined in 
earlier studies, no research has considered the impact of investor sentiment. 
For example, Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) find that unexpected SEO 
underpricing is related to information gathering and marketing activities, and 
Corwin (2003) argues that SEO underpricing is related to price pressure and 
uncertainty.8
 
Similar findings are reported in the context of REITs. Ghosh, 
Nag, and Sirmans (2000) document that  significant REIT SEO underpricing is 
related with institutional ownership, issue size, and underwriter reputation. 
Goodwin (2011) further argues that when there is high placement cost and 
value uncertainty with new REIT shares, investors will ask for a greater 
discount. These papers extensively examine determinants of SEO discounting 
and underpricing, but none of them examines the impact of investor sentiment 
-- the main variable in my analysis.9  
While, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the 
impact of investor sentiment on the seasoned equity pricing process of REITs. 
Several papers have examined the impact of investor sentiment on IPO 
pricing. These studies document a positive relationship between investor 
sentiment and IPO underpricing, and a negative relationship between 
sentiment and long- run returns (Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist 2006; 
Derrien 2005). However, SEO issues are very different from IPO issues. IPO 
firms arrive to the market for the first time with little or no track record, and 
                                                            
8 Previous literature overwhelmingly uses the term "underpricing" to describe the percentage 
difference between SEO offer price and first day market price because most papers assume 
that the market price on the first day is the "true price." A more appropriate term would be 
"first day return." I will use “underpricing” and “first day return” interchangeably throughout 
the paper.  
9 Corwin (2003) also reports that SEO underpricing is related to the concurrent level of 
underpricing in the IPO market, suggesting a common underlying factor influencing both IPO 
and SEO markets which may plausibly be investor sentiment. However, he does not elaborate 
on this factor nor does he pursue this enquiry further.  
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their valuations are notoriously difficult to estimate (Kim and Ritter 1999). 
There is a huge uncertainty about these firms, not only with regard to future 
cash flows and risks, but also with regard to institutional interest and liquidity. 
In short, perceptions about the IPO firm and the response of market 
participants to the newly traded firm cannot be predicted with a high degree of 
certainty. In contrast, seasoned firms are well established and their valuations 
are easily observable in the secondary market. Underwriters have a pretty 
good estimate about the level of institutional interest and the liquidity of these 
firms’ shares. Hence, it remains an open question if the evidence of 
sentiment’s impact on IPO pricing could be extended to seasoned equity 
markets. My study sample covers all US-listed equity REIT firms and spans a 
24-year period from 1986 to 2009. The empirical results suggest that the SEO 
price formation is strongly influenced by sentiment investors. Consistent with 
market timing and behavioral finance explanations, I observe a strong positive 
relation between investor sentiment and pre-SEO mispricing, which further 
affects the probability of issuance. Sentiment is negatively related to the 
announcement abnormal returns. Further, I document that investor sentiment 
is positively related with SEO discounting and underpricing, but negatively 
related with long-run stock returns. Overall, investor sentiment seems to play 
an important role in the seasoned equity offerings pricing process. 
My contributions are manifold.  First, I contribute to the seasoned equity 
issuance literature by providing evidence that investor sentiment is positively 
related to pre-SEO mispricing levels, a relationship that further influences the 
REIT equity offering decision and thus supports the notion that managers time 
the market in the presence of investor sentiment. Second, I contribute to the 
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determinants of SEO discounting and underpricing by providing another 
important determinant--investor sentiment. Finally, this paper contributes to 
REIT literature by providing the most comprehensive analysis thus far of 
REIT SEO issuance.  
I recognize that it is impossible to absolutely rule out unobservable 
fundamental risk factor as responsible for some of my results. However, I 
control for nine macroeconomic variables correlated with fundamental 
measures of risk, as well as factors such as time-varying growth opportunities, 
information asymmetry, and risk premia. While unobservable risk factor may 
conceivably account for some of my findings in isolation, investor sentiment 
explains my results in their entirety. Hence, I consider unobservable risk factor 
an unlikely explanation for my results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I review the relevant literature in Section II 
and construct the hypotheses in Section III. Section IV describes the data. 
Section V discusses the empirical results. Section VI presents the robustness 
test. Section VII concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Investor Sentiment 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) interpret investor sentiment as a misguided belief 
about a firm’s risks or future cash flows based on the available information. 
Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldamann (1990) develop a model in which 
overlapping generations of sentiment investors enter and exit the market 
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together and trade on the noisy information. The key feature of their model is 
limits to arbitrage. Specifically, the correlated trading of sentiment investors 
deters rational arbitrageurs from taking offsetting positions that would bring 
prices back to fundamental values. Hence, limits to arbitrage and correlated 
sentiment investor trading cause prices to deviate from fundamental values 
even in the absence of fundamental risk. Stein (1996) models the effect of 
investor sentiment and shows that the marginal cost of issuing equity, which 
arises from deviation from current capital structure, is balanced with marginal 
issuance benefit, i.e. the direct market timing gains from stock mispricing. 
This suggests that managers maximize the current price of the firm’s securities 
by catering to sentiment investors. In so doing, managers capture the demand 
side surplus and exploit the current mispricing for the benefit of current 
investors by allowing them to sell the overvalued stocks to overconfident 
investors. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) further propose a 
theory to explain securities market under- and overreactions, arguing that 
overconfidence and self-attribution lead to negative long-lag autocorrelations 
and return predictability when managers take advantage of stock mispricing. 
Prior literature utilizes several proxies for investor sentiment. Direct measures 
of investor sentiment are derived from surveys such as the  Index of Consumer 
Sentiment (ICS) constructed by Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan, and 
the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index (CBIND) constructed by 
the Conference Board  (Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006). Qiu and Welch 
(2004) evaluate several  sentiment measures and conclude that the Conference 
Board Consumer Confidence Index and Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
best  represent the behavior of sentiment investors. The most prominent 
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indirect measure is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) index (B-W), which uses a 
“top-down” and macroeconomic approach to measure aggregate sentiment in 
the market. B-W is calculated as the principal component from closed end 
fund discount, dividend premium, NYSE turnover, first day IPO returns, 
number of IPOs, and proportion of equity offerings.  
4.2.2 SEO Price Dynamics 
Price dynamics of seasoned equity offerings are less studied and explored than 
those surrounding initial public offerings. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find that 
SEO offer prices for firm commitments of industrial and utility issuers were 
on average underpriced by 0.44 percent over the 1963-1981 period. Altinkiliç 
and Hansen (2003) empirically estimate expected SEO discounting and find 
that unexpected SEO discounting is related to information gathering and 
marketing activities. Corwin (2003) argues that SEO underpricing is related to 
price pressure and uncertainty. Corwin (2003) also reports that SEO 
underpricing is related to the concurrent level of underpricing in the IPO 
market, a result which suggests that a common underlying factor influences 
both IPO and SEO underpricing, and this factor may plausibly be sentiment. 
However, neither Corwin (2003) nor Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) examine 
the impact of investor sentiment on SEO pricing. 
The literature on REIT seasoned equity offerings is well established.  A large 
literature provides estimates of the market reaction to security issue 
announcements.  As with general stocks, there is a significant negative 
announcement reaction consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984). Using REIT 
data from 1970 to 1985, Howe and Shilling (1988) document a negative stock 
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price reaction to equity offerings and a positive stock price reaction to debt 
offerings. Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (1999) confirm those  findings using 
REIT equity offerings in the 1990s.  
Another strand of literature on REIT seasoned equity offerings addresses 
capital structure changes.  Because trade-off and pecking order rationales do 
not apply to REITs thanks to their unique characteristics, previous literature on 
REIT capital structure largely focuses on the signaling effects of equity and 
debt offerings of REITs (Howe and Shilling, 1988; Brown and Riddiough, 
2003). Recent empirical results show that REITs time market within a general 
targeted debt ratio environment. Ooi, Ong, and Li (2010) examine  public 
offerings timing attempts in REITs and targeted debt ratios. They point out 
that REITs time market within a general targeted debt ratio environment. 
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) and Ghosh, Roark, and Sirmans (2011) also 
document strong evidence in support of  the market timing theory to explain 
REIT issuance decisions.  
However, few studies examine REITs’ SEO pricing. Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans 
(2000) document that  significant REIT SEO underpricing is associated  with 
institutional ownership, issue size, and underwriter reputation. Goodwin 
(2011) further argues that when there is high placement cost and value 
uncertainty surrounding  new REIT shares, investors will ask for a greater 
discount. Surprisingly,  no study examines the  relationship between investor 
sentiment and the REIT seasoned equity issuance and  pricing process. 
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4.2.3 Investor Sentiment and Equity Offerings 
Several studies examine the impact of sentiment in the IPO market. In Derrien 
(2005)’s model of IPO pricing, underwriters trade off the benefits of a higher 
offer price if high sentiment continues, against the cost of price support if 
sentiment investors leave the market and the aftermarket price falls below the 
offer price. Therefore, because investor sentiment is only partially 
incorporated into the offer price, it results in greater underpricing. Ljungqvist, 
Nanda, and Singh (2006) develop a model in which the optimal strategy for an 
underwriter is to place IPO shares with regular investors who hold onto them 
during the first stage and resell them to sentiment investors in the second 
stage. Issuers underprice the IPO to compensate regular investors for their 
possible loss if sentiment investors do not arrive in the second stage; this 
strategy leaves regular investors trapped with overpriced shares. Along these 
lines, Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) and Dorn (2009) use “gray 
market” pre-IPO prices as a proxy for investor sentiment, and find evidence 
that sentiment is positively correlated with initial returns and negatively 
correlated with the long-run returns consistent with the impact of sentiment. 
Hrnjic and Sankaraguruswamy (2013) show that the positive relationship 
between sentiment and underpricing and the negative relationship between 
sentiment and long-run returns are a result of  systematic (market-wide) 
sentiment, and that  evidence of the impact of idiosyncratic sentiment is less 
compelling. 
As for the SEO market, the implications on investor sentiment are mixed. Chiu 
and Kini (2013) find that aggregate equity mutual fund flows influence the 
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firm’s decision to conduct SEOs, which they interpret it as the impact of 
investor sentiment. However, Howe and Zhang (2010) report an insignificant 
relation on SEO decisions using consumer sentiment index from the 
Conference Board. 
 
4.3 Empirical Implications 
Existing models in the literature (Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist 2006; 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998; Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 
2006; Stein 1996) allow us to make predictions about the relationship between  
investor sentiment and firms’ seasoned equity offering price dynamics.  
Managers issue equity in order to take advantage of the inflated share price. 
Investors in the market, who know that managers are opportunistic, take SEO 
announcement as a signal of overvaluation. Market participants revise the 
firm’s valuation downward, which leads to the negative effect on the share 
price—that is, negative returns at the announcement day (Eckbo and Masulis 
1995; Masulis and Korwar 1986). Markets in high sentiment periods are 
dominated by overoptimistic sentiment investors who cause market-wide 
deviation from fundamental values. In markets with unsophisticated investors, 
managers have even greater incentive to act opportunistically. Hence, I 
conjecture that opportunistic behavior is exacerbated during high sentiment 
periods, and I expect firms to have higher probability of SEO issuance and 
SEO firms to be more overpriced than non-SEO firms. At the same time, 
investors adjust for managers’ opportunistic behavior and, therefore, the SEO 
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announcement conveys even more negative news during high sentiment 
periods. I conjecture that this results in more negative returns at the 
announcement. Overall, my reasoning leads to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Pre-SEO stock mispricing is positively correlated with investor 
sentiment. 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of SEO issuance is positively correlated with 
investor sentiment. 
Hypothesis 3: The SEO announcement return is negatively correlated with 
investor sentiment. 
I have hypothesized that managers of SEO firms act opportunistically and 
issue equity when investor sentiment is high and shares are overpriced. 
However, it is not obvious how this behavior will influence pricing of the new 
issue. Managers and underwriters are aware that the market is dominated by 
sentiment investors; they may take advantage of that over-optimism and 
increase the SEO offer price, thus decreasing the discount from the previous 
day’s closing price.10 On the other hand, underwriters usually place new SEO 
shares with regular investors with whom they nurture long-term relationships, 
anticipating repeated interactions in future issues.  Because underwriters know 
that shares are overpriced and will eventually revert to true value, they may 
decide to protect their regular investors from expected long-run declines in 
share price. In that case, underwriters will price SEO shares lower, that is at a 
larger discount. Ultimately, the impact of investor sentiment on discounting 
                                                            
10 For ease of interpretation, we express discounting as a positive (percentage) value if offer 
price is lower than the previous day’s closing price. 
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and underpricing (first day return) is an empirical issue. This reasoning leads 
us to following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4A: Investor sentiment is positively correlated with SEO 
discounting. 
Hypothesis 4B: Investor sentiment is negatively correlated with SEO 
discounting. 
Hypothesis 5A: Investor sentiment is positively correlated with SEO 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 5B: Investor sentiment is negatively correlated with SEO 
underpricing. 
According to Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), investor 
sentiment implies negative long-lag autocorrelations and return predictability 
when managers take advantage of stock mispricing. During high sentiment 
periods, markets are dominated by overoptimistic investors who are willing to 
pay a price exceeding fundamental value and this leads to overpricing of SEO 
firms. Over the long run, valuations revert to the fundamental value as 
sentiment investors leave the market.  Thus, I expect long-run returns to be 
negative following high sentiment periods.  





4.4 Data  
In this paper, I use SEOs issued by equity REIT firms (SIC code=6798) from 
January 1, 1986 to December 31, 2009, as reported in the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database.  I begin the study period in   1986, because  the 
Tax Reform Act was introduced in that year, allowing  REITs to engage in a 
variety of real estate activities that require them  to resort to external financing 
more frequently. My sample ends in 2009, because I need one extra year of 
data for long-run returns. Accounting information and stock price data are 
retrieved from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). I further restrict the SEO sample to common shares. My final sample 
consists of 840 US equity REIT SEOs. Due to availability of additional data, 
some of my findings are based on smaller samples. 
 
4.5 Research Design 
4.5.1 Survey-based Proxies for Investor Sentiment 
Researchers use both direct and indirect proxies for investor sentiment. In this 
paper, I adopt the survey-based indices as proxies for investor sentiment. In a 
robustness test, I use the indirect measure of investor sentiment to verify the 
results. 
I use sentiment indices from the Survey of Consumers constructed by 
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Survey Research Center and the 
Consumer Confidence Survey constructed by the Conference Board. Both 
indices are shown to be valid measures of investor sentiment in Qiu and 
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Welch (2004) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006).11
 
The monthly surveys 
conducted by Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan use about 50 core 
questions that reflect respondents’ attitudes and expectations about overall 
economic conditions and personal finances. Answers to interviews with 500 
households across the US are aggregated into the popular and widely used 
Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS). Likewise, the Conference Board’s Index 
of Consumer Confidence (CBIND) is constructed monthly based on 
interviews about customers’ perceptions of economic conditions in the United 
States, with a sample size of 5,000 households. 
Because REITs bridge both financial and real estate markets, it is plausible 
that REITs’ equity issuance is influenced by investor sentiment from the real 
estate as well as the financial market. I proxy for investor sentiment in the real 
estate market with the buying condition survey conducted by Thomson 
Reuters/University of Michigan. Respondents from a sample of 500 
households are asked if it is a good time to purchase a property and why. 
These responses are aggregated into the relative value of buyers’ perception of 
real estate market (BC).  
It is plausible that the sentiment survey values convey information about 
sentiment as well as the economy fundamentals. To capture the excess 
optimism or pessimism, I remove the effect of economy fundamentals from 
the raw survey values by regressing the values against a set of variables 
suggested in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) as reported in Table 4.1.   
                                                            
11 These measures are also used in numerous other papers (Lemmon and Ni 2011; Hrnjic and 






















            
(20) 
Where DIV is the dividend yields, DEF is the yield spread between Moody’s 
Aaa and Baa-rated bonds, YLD3 is the three-month Treasury bill yield, GDP 
is GDP growth deflated to 2005 dollars (in the natural logarithm), CONS is 
personal consumption expenditures growth (in the natural logarithm), LABOR 
is the labor income growth (in the natural logarithm) deflated by the PCE 
deflator, URATE is the adjusted unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, CPI  is the inflation rate, and CAY  is consumption-to-wealth 
ratio.12 The residual from the above equation is labeled ICSR. If I use CBIND 
and BC as a proxy for sentiment, residuals are labeled CBINDR and BCR, 
respectively. ICSR and CBINDR measure the excess optimism or pessimism 
of consumers and are my proxies for investor sentiment. BCR measures the 
excess optimism or pessimism of housing buyers and is my proxy for investor 
sentiment in the real estate market. 
[Insert Table 4.1] 
4.5.2 Indirect Measure of Sentiment 
Another widely used measure of sentiment is the Baker-Wurgler investor 
sentiment index (BW) (Baker and Wurgler 2006; Baker and Wurgler 2007; 
Campbell, Rhee, Du and Tang 2008; McLean and Zhao 2012; Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy 2012; Sankaraguruswamy and Mian 2008). The Baker-
                                                            
12 Because our sentiment measure is taken monthly, for quarterly macro data we use the same 
value for all months in that quarter. 
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Wurgler investor sentiment index is calculated as the first principal component 
from the following variables: closed end fund discount, dividend premium, 
turnover, first day IPO returns, IPO number and proportion of equity 
offering.13 I utilize the Baker-Wurgler investor sentiment index as the indirect 
measure for investor sentiment. 
4.5.3 Pre-SEO Misvaluation 
To examine the impact of investor sentiment on misvaluation before SEO, I 
decompose pre-issue market-to-book (m-b) ratios into misvaluation (m-v) and 
growth opportunities (v-b) following the methodology developed by Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) (RKRV, hereafter ), and utilized in 
several recent papers (Fu, Lin and Officer 2010; Hertzel and Li 2010; Hoberg 
and Phillips 2010) . 
If investors overestimate the future cash flows or underestimate risks, the 
market-to-value ratio will capture the mispricing component of the market-to-
book ratio. RKRV methodology estimates the firm value v by estimating both 
industry level accounting multiples and long-run firm accounting multiples 
using the following equation. 
itjitjitjtitjtitititit bvvvvmbm  );();();();(                             
(21) 
The first component 
);( jtitit vm   measures the difference between market 
value and fundamental value estimated using firm-specific accounting data 
                                                            
13 For more details on the construction of the index, see Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
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and the contemporaneous industry accounting multiples. This component is 
the mispricing proxy I use in this paper. The second component is the sector 
overvaluation. The third component itjit
bv );( 
 captures the growth 
opportunities.  
To empirically separate the mispricing component, RKRV (2005) adopt three 
different models to estimate firm value. I adopt RKRV’s   third model to 
estimate the market value as follows14: 




4)0(3210 )ln()ln(                 
(22)     
where m is market value of equity, b is a book value of equity, 
)ln(NI
, is the 
natural logarithm of positive net income, I is an indicator function for negative 
net income observations, and LEV  is leverage ratio.  
To calculate the REITs’ industry-wide accounting multiples, I run cross-
sectional regressions for the REIT industry to obtain the estimated REIT 
industry accounting multiples jt
ˆ
for each year t. Table 4.2 presents the time-
series averages (over fiscal years 1985–2010) of the annual regression 
coefficients for the equation (2). 
Hence, the estimated firm value is obtained in equation (3) below. 
                                                            
14 The first model includes book value and the second model includes net income in addition 
to book value. Our results remain robust to either of these models. RKRV provides a detailed 
discussion of the rationale behind these models. 
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
                 
(23) 
[Insert Table 4.2] 
The difference between market value it
m
 prior to SEO issuance and the 
estimated firm value 
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ;,,( 3210 jtjtjtjtititit LEVNIbv   is my proxy for 
stock mispricing. 
4.5.4 SEO Announcement Return 
I estimate the cumulative abnormal returns CAR using the standard market 
model event-study methodology over interval (-3 to +3) 






 are the period-t returns for security j and the market 
portfolio.  
Daily returns for individual stock and the market index are obtained from 
CRSP. For the market index, I employ the Ziman REIT value-weighted 
market index. 
4.5.5 SEO Discounting and Underpricing Variables 
To analyze the price dynamics around SEOs, I define discounting as the 
(negative of) percentage difference between the offer price and the closing 
price on the prior trading day (Altinkilic and Hansen 2003; Corwin 2003; 
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Goodwin 2011). Note that this variable is positive if the offer price is lower 
than the previous day’s closing price. I define underpricing as the percentage 
change from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day after 
SEO (Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans 2000; Goodwin 2011). 
4.5.6 Long-run Abnormal Return 
I define long-run abnormal return as SEO risk-adjusted return for 3, 6, and 12 
months using Fama-French four factor model. 
jfmtfjjt UMDHMLSMBRRRR   4321 )(                                      
(25) 
where  r is the REIT’s rate of return, Rf is the risk-free return rate, RM is the 
return of the stock market, SMB stands for return of "small minus big" 
portfolio, HML stands for return on "high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market" portfolio, and UMD stands for  momentum factor (MOM), which is 
long prior-month winners and short prior-month losers. 
4.5.7 Control Variables 
To analyze the impact of investor sentiment on SEO price dynamics, I control 
for other determinants of price dynamics that have been documented in prior 
studies. Information asymmetry (InfoAs) is measured as the abnormal return 
around earning announcement releases (Lowry, 2003). I control for time-
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varying growth opportunities (Growth) using the growth component from 
RKRV decomposition (Yung, Çolak and Wei 2008).15
 
 
I am aware that market conditions influence price dynamics around SEOs.  
Because market return is correlated with investor sentiment, I compute the risk 
premium (Rpremia) over the past 1 month prior to issue date to capture the 
time-variant cost of equity. I use the 6-month government bond yield (Byield) 
to measure the attractiveness of the equity offering. 
Offer size (Size) is the relative SEO offer size (number of shares offered 
multiplied by offer price) scaled by market capitalization of the issuing firm  
(Altinkiliç and Hansen 2003; Brounen and Eichholtz 2001). Underwriter 
ranking (Uranking) is defined in Carter and Manaster (1990), and updated by 
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004); it serves as a 
proxy for the underwriter reputation (Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans 2000; 
Goodwin 2011).16
 
 I add total assets (Asset) to control for firm size. Leverage 
(Lev) allows us to separate the impact of leverage documented by (Brounen 
and Eichholtz 2001). SeqREIT is constructed as the current SEO sequence of 
the REIT to account for the clustering and frequency of SEO (Ghosh, Nag and 
Sirmans 2000). Yearslisted is the number of years between the SEO year and 
the IPO year to measure the stage in firm life cycle as suggested in 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 2010). NASDAQ equals 1 if the firm is listed 
on NASDAQ, and 0  otherwise (Mola and Loughran 2004). 
 
                                                            
15 I do not use Tobin-Q or market-to-book ratio because it contains information in addition to 
firm growth opportunities. 




4.6 Empirical Results 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics and the description of all variables 
used in this paper.17 In general, the mean pre-SEO mispricing level is 3.16, 
which shows that SEO stocks are on average overvalued before issuance 
compared to their peers. The mean accumulative abnormal return around 
announcements is -1.75%. In comparison, the average abnormal return is -2% 
for SEOs by US general firms (Altinkiliç and Hansen 2003; Asquith and 
Mullins Jr 1986; Eckbo and Masulis 1992). The mean Discounting and 
Underpricing are 2.77% and 1.64% respectively. In comparison, the average 
underpricing level is 2.92% in the 1990s and 1.3% in the 1980s for SEOs by 
US general firms (Corwin 2003). Given the high payout ratio, it is not 
surprising that REIT firms conduct equity offerings at a higher frequency 
(mean SeqREIT is 4.45) and have a relatively high leverage ratio (mean 
53.9%). The mean Yearlisted is 8.83 years, suggesting that SEO firms are on 
average in their pre-mature stage.  
[Insert Table 4.3] 
4.6.2 Sentiment and Pre-SEO Misvaluation 
Based on the discussion in Section 4.3, hypothesis 1 predicts that pre-SEO 
stock mispricing is positively related with investor sentiment. As described in 
                                                            
17 I also calculate the correlation matrix for the independent variables in the unreported 
analysis. The magnitude of the variance-inflating factors (VIF) suggests that the independent 




Section 4.5, I adopt RKRV methodology to calculate the mispricing (PreMis), 
using firm stock closing price the day prior to SEO issuance. I analyze the 
relation between sentiment and pre-issuance mispricing of SEO firms in the 











           
(26)  
Table 4.4 shows the results. The coefficients for investor sentiment proxies are 
all significant and positive. Stock mispricing increases as sentiment increases, 
indicating that periods of high sentiment might be a good time for managers to 
time the market and issue the equity to exploit prevailing sentiment. My 
model’s explanatory power (adjusted R square) increases after incorporating 
sentiment variables. 
I document a negative relationship between mispricing level and risk 
premium, but this relationship is insignificant. Information asymmetry 
(InfoAs) is also insignificant. Surprisingly, mispricing is higher for older firms 
and frequent equity issuers. I find a positive relationship between mispricing 
and Byield. 
Overall, my findings are consistent with the hypothesis that pre-SEO stock 
mispricing is positively correlated with investor sentiment. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
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4.6.3 Sentiment and SEO Probability  
In order to test hypothesis 2, I specify a discrete choice probability model to 
analyze the impact of sentiment on the decision to issue SEO. The probit 
model identifies an equity issuance for every REIT in my sample on a monthly 
basis. The dependent variable equals 1 if an SEO is observed, 0 otherwise.  
Table 4.5 reports the results from the probit model for SEO issuance. All 
coefficients have predicted signs. All coefficients for investor sentiment 
proxies are positive. Coefficient on ICSR is not significant at the conventional 
levels; coefficients on CBINDR, BCR, and BW are significant at a 1% level of 
confidence. A higher level of investor sentiment tends to increase the 
probability of SEO issuance, consistent with the market-timing theory of SEO 
(Loughran and Ritter 1997).
18
 
Yearslisted, which proxies for corporate life stage cycle, is significant and 
negatively related with SEO issuance probability. This lends support to the 
lifecycle theory that predicts young firms sell stock to fund investment 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2010).  A positive relationship between 
sentiment and firms listed on NASDAQ, which are usually younger firms, is 
also consistent with life-cycle theory. I document the positive coefficient on 
Growth, suggesting that an increase in the growth opportunities increases the 
likelihood of SEO. This finding is consistent with the investment-based 
explanation for SEO issuance that managers issue equity by timing the 
                                                            
18 In unreported analysis, I document that a higher level of investor sentiment tends to increase 




investment (Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 2006). Risk premia is positively 
related to the equity issuance.  
Overall, findings in Table 4.5 support hypothesis 2 that investor sentiment 
positively affects the probability of SEO issuance. 
[Insert Table 4.5] 
4.6.4 Sentiment and SEO Announcement Effect 
I calculate the cumulative abnormal returns CAR using cumulative excess 
return over interval (-3 to +3) for a subsample of 714 SEO issues with the 
announcement date available in SDC. I observe a statistically significant 
decline of 1.75% in the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with 
the SEO announcements. It seems that when investors interpret an equity 
issuance announcement as an indicator of stock overvaluation, the stock price 
declines. This evidence is consistent with the negative price reaction 
documented by previous studies and Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order 
theory.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that high sentiment periods will be associated with 
lower (more negative) announcement abnormal returns. Hence, I examine the 
impact of investor sentiment on the announcement effect (CAR) in a 













Table 4.6 presents the results. I note that ICSR, BCR, and BW are 
significantly negatively related to cumulative abnormal return, suggesting that 
a higher level of investor sentiment exacerbates managers’ incentives and 
price decline is amplified. I note that an increase in the growth opportunities 
significantly decreases the REIT announcement return, consistent with the 
investment-based explanation for SEO issuance that managers issue equity by 
timing the investment as a real option (Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 2006). 
I also observe that SEO size (Size) has a positive impact on abnormal returns. 
Larger REITs (Asset) tend to perform better as evidenced by the positive and 
significant coefficient.  REITs with lower leverage are associated with a more 
positive, but insignificant, effect on announcement abnormal returns.  
Overall, Table 4.6 supports hypothesis 3 that high sentiment periods are 
associated with lower (more negative) announcement abnormal returns. 
[Insert Table 4.6] 
4.6.5 Sentiment and SEO Discounting 
In Section 4.3, I argue that investor sentiment exerts two opposite effects  on 
SEO discounting. The direct market timing gains would predict a negative 
relationship, whereas the reputational effects and the catering to regular 
investors would predict a positive relationship. Hence, it is an empirical issue 
to determine which effect dominates. I specify the following regression to 















            
(28) 
Table 4.7 reports the results of the impact of sentiment on SEO discounting. I 
note that all direct measures of investor sentiment are statistically significant 
and positive, indicating that investor sentiment positively impacts the 
discounting level consistent with hypothesis 4A. In high sentiment periods, 
firms tend to set offer price lower relative to the previous day’s closing price. 
This pattern further suggests that firms do not fully incorporate the effect of 
prevailing sentiment when setting the offer price.  
Next, I discuss other control variables. Discounting is likely to be lower for 
small firms (Asset) and firms with a higher risk premium, which is a proxy for 
the cost of equity. Firms tend to discount more when there is more information 
asymmetry between SEO firm managers and outside investors, consistent with 
pecking order theory. Underwriter reputation (Uranking) is negative but 
insignificant, consistent with Goodwin (2011). Coefficient on relative offer 
size (Size) is negative, consistent with Corwin (2003), but insignificant.  
Overall, results strongly support hypothesis 4A that investor sentiment is 
positively correlated with SEO discounting. 
[Insert Table 4.7] 
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4.6.6 Sentiment and SEO Underpricing 
Next, I estimate the following regression to examine the impact of investor 













       
(29) 
Table 4.8 shows the results. I observe that all direct measures of investor 
sentiment are significant and positive, implying that an increase in investor 
sentiment leads to increase in the underpricing consistent with hypothesis 5A. 
As sentiment investors bid up the stock price, underpricing is positively 
related to the level of sentiment, consistent with a similar finding in the IPO 
market (Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 2006).  
Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991) argue that many of the IPO theories 
based on asymmetric information can be applied to seasoned equity offerings. 
Corwin (2003) provides analysis of these theories in the context of SEOs, 
whereas Goodwin (2011) examines the information asymmetry theories in the 
context of REIT SEOs. All of these theories predict a positive relationship 
between the level of information asymmetry and underpricing. The positive 
and significant relation between InfoAs  and underpricing is consistent with 
this reasoning (coefficient=0.0637, t-stat=2.09). 
Next, I discuss control variables. Firms with a higher risk premium have 
greater underpricing. The coefficient on leverage (Lev) is positive and 
111 
 
significant, suggesting that highly leveraged firms have greater underpricing. 
The coefficient on the offer size of the SEO (Size) is significantly negative, 
consistent with Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (2000). Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans 
(1998) and Goodwin (2011) find a negative, but insignificant, relationship. 
The coefficient on underwriter’s reputation (Uranking) is negative and 
significant, consistent with Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (1998, 2000). Goodwin 
(2001) reports an insignificant coefficient. Firms listed on NASDAQ have less 
significant underpricing.  Overall, Table 4.8 supports hypothesis 5A that 
investor sentiment is positively correlated with SEO underpricing. 
[Insert Table 4.8] 
4.6.7 Sentiment and SEO Long-run Return 
Finally, to test hypothesis 6 I examine the impact of investor sentiment on 
long-term stock performance. If managers time the market, I expect to observe 
lower long-run underperformance after seasoned equity offerings (Loughran 
and Ritter 1995) as the sentiment investors leave the market and prices revert 
to their fundamental values. Hence, a negative correlation between investor 
sentiment and long-run SEO performance is consistent with a behavioral 
explanation (Cornelli, Ljungqvist, and Goldreich, 2006). Although I have 
controlled for fundamentals in the SEO decision and pricing, it is not 
impossible that my sentiment variables may proxy for some underlying 
unobservable fundamentals. If my sentiment variables proxy for the 
unobservable fundamentals, SEO prices will stay at the new level and I expect 
future performance to be unrelated with sentiment at issuance.  
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I calculate the SEO long-term risk adjusted return (ALret) for 3, 6, and 12 
months using Fama-French four factor model. I specify a following 










             
(30) 
Table 4.9 reports that all sentiment variables have significantly negative 
coefficients. This result suggests that the market corrects the overvaluation 
and SEOs revert to their fundamental values as sentiment investors leave the 
market, consistent with hypothesis 6. Furthermore, the model’s explanatory 
power (adjusted R square) increases after incorporating sentiment variables.  
Control variables which explain the short-run price dynamics are insignificant 
in explaining the long-run return. Specifically, information asymmetry 
(InfoAs) has no effect on SEO long-run return, reinforcing the notion that the 
sentiment explanation is different from information asymmetry explanations 
for equity issuance. Overall, my findings support hypothesis 6 that long-run 
returns after SEO are more negative after high sentiment periods.  
[Insert Table 4.9] 
4.7 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I conduct the robustness tests by analyzing the asymmetric 




4.7.1 Asymmetric Effect of Sentiment 
Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) suggest that the impact of 
sentiment on stock price is asymmetric between high and low sentiment 
periods (Hrnjić and Sankaraguruswamy 2011 ; Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 
2006). In high sentiment periods sentiment investors are overoptimistic and 
bid the price above the fundamental value. However, in low sentiment periods 
when sentiment investors are excessively pessimistic, they leave the market 
and regular investors set the price at fundamental value. Hence, I expect a 
stronger relationship between sentiment and discounting in high sentiment 
periods and a weaker relationship in low sentiment periods. Similarly, I expect 
a stronger relationship between sentiment and underpricing in high sentiment 
periods and a weaker relationship in low sentiment periods. I test the 
asymmetric relationship between sentiment and SEO pricing by interacting 
CBINDR with CBINDR –AB66, where CBINDR –AB66 proxies for high 
sentiment periods. I report in Table 4.10 that the coefficient on interaction 
variable HighSentiment is positive and significant for both discounting and 
underpricing, suggesting that the relationship between sentiment and SEO 
pricing is asymmetric. 
[Insert Table 4.10] 
4.7.2 Hot Market Effect 
A possible concern is that SEOs issued in high sentiment periods are of lower 
quality than those issued in low sentiment periods. One way to address this 
concern is to compare SEOs issued in high sentiment periods vs. low 
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sentiment periods following (Helwege and Liang 2004). Conditional on 
issuing, I estimate the probability that firms conduct SEOs during high 
sentiment periods. From Table 4.11, I observe that high sentiment and low 
sentiment periods do not differ much in quality of REIT SEOs. While I 
observe that REITs that decide to issue SEO in high sentiment periods have 
lower growth potential, they are also larger and have lower leverage. Hence, it 
seems that Table 11 does not support the notion that SEOs issued in high 
sentiment periods are of lower quality. 
[Insert Table 4.11] 
4.8 Conclusions 
I examine the impact of investor sentiment on SEO pricing. Behavioral models 
argue for the arrival of overlapping generations of sentiment investors to the 
market characterized with limits-to-arbitrage. Correlated trading of sentiment 
investors exerts upward pressure on prices, causing deviation from 
fundamental value and managers’ rationally respond to the overvaluation by 
issuing overvalued equity. This setting provides an opportunity to test a rich 
set of hypotheses about the impact of investor sentiment on SEO pricing, but 
empirical literature thus far has remained silent on the topic. This paper fills 
the gap in the literature. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the impact of 
investor sentiment on seasoned equity offerings price dynamics. My empirical 
results suggest that investor sentiment is positively correlated with pre-SEO 
mispricing and the probability of SEO issuance. I also find that announcement 
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returns are negatively related to sentiment, which indicates that the market 
interprets SEO announcements in high sentiment periods as a more negative 
signal than similar announcements in low sentiment periods. More important, I 
document that investor sentiment is positively related with SEO discounting; 
that is, the higher the sentiment, the larger the discount from the previous 
day’s closing price. Similarly, high sentiment periods are correlated with 
higher first day returns. Finally, because I find that post-SEO long-run returns 
are more negative in high sentiment periods, I propose that sentiment does not 
proxy for unobservable risk characteristics.  
My paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, market timing 
theory predicts that firms conduct equity issuance when the shares are 
overvalued. In this paper, I examine the extent to which investors’ sentiment 
contributes to equity decisions and SEO price dynamics and report that 
managers issue more often when sentiment is high and shares are overpriced. 
Second, my paper contributes to the determinants of SEO discounting and 
underpricing.  Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003), Mola and 
Lughran (2004), Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (2000), and Goodwin (2011) 
empirically examine determinants of SEO discounting and underpricing, but 
none of these papers examines the impact of investor sentiment. This is the 
first paper to document the significant impact of investor sentiment on SEO 
pricing process. Third, I contribute to sentiment literature by providing an 
additional setting in which behavioral biases affect price formation process. 
Finally, this paper contributes to REIT literature by providing the most 
comprehensive analysis of REIT SEO and pricing to date. 
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Overall, investor sentiment seems to play an important role in seasoned equity 
offerings price patterns. My findings are consistent with market timing and 




Table 4.1 Estimation of Investor Sentiment Proxies  
This table presents the results of estimating investor sentiment proxies. Dependent 
variables are the raw investor sentiment measures, i.e. the Index of Consumer 
Sentiment, the Index of Consumer Confidence, and the Index of Buying Condition. 
Independent variables are macroeconomic variables and their lag term, Where DIV is 
the dividend yields, DEF is the yield spread between Moody’s Aaa and Baa-rated 
bonds, YLD3 is the three-month Treasury bill yield, GDP is GDP growth deflated to 
2005 dollars (in the natural logarithm), CONS is personal consumption expenditures 
growth (in the natural logarithm), LABOR is the labor income growth (in the natural 
logarithm) deflated by the PCE deflator, URATE is the adjusted unemployment rate 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI is the inflation rate, and CAY  is 
consumption-to-wealth ratio. The residuals are ICSR, CBINDR, and BCR, 
respectively. 
  ICS CBIND BC 
DIV -1515.5* -1507.7 -1345.0 
 (-1.67) (-1.05) (-0.84) 
DEF -3.013 -11.72* 2.411 
 (-0.67) (-1.66) (0.31) 
YLD3 12.44*** 17.68*** 5.224 
 (6.55) (5.88) (1.56) 
GDP 0.635 2.468 2.723 
 (0.54) (1.32) (1.31) 
CONS 2.739*** 4.286** 1.805 
 (2.60) (2.57) (0.97) 
LABOR 0.000660 -1.434 0.219 
 (0.00) (-1.10) (0.15) 
URATE -7.321** -14.76*** -7.541 
 (-2.58) (-3.29) (-1.51) 
CPI -149.9 -588.6*** -211.1 
 (-1.06) (-2.63) (-0.85) 
CAY 132.7 270.2* 307.6* 
 (1.32) (1.70) (1.73) 
LDIV -1165.4 -2752.1* -2539.7 
 (-1.24) (-1.86) (-1.54) 
LDEF 3.284 20.65*** -1.543 
 (0.76) (3.02) (-0.20) 
LYLD3 -9.936*** -11.48*** -7.058** 
 (-5.40) (-3.94) (-2.17) 
LGDP 2.677** 4.259** 4.330** 
 (2.26) (2.27) (2.07) 
LCONS 1.502 1.977 3.867** 
 (1.38) (1.15) (2.01) 
LLABOR 0.486 0.395 0.639 
 (0.58) (0.30) (0.43) 
LURATE 5.488* 3.129 11.87** 
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 (1.96) (0.70) (2.40) 
LCPI -581.7*** -421.8** -450.7* 
 (-4.35) (-1.99) (-1.91) 
LCAY -99.67 -272.6* 11.98 
 (-1.00) (-1.73) (0.07) 
CONSTANT 98.20*** 143.1*** 143.5*** 
 (26.10) (24.02) (21.61) 
        
Number of Obs 288 288 288 
Adjusted R2 0.719 0.848 0.524 




Table 4.2 Time-Series Average Conditional Regression Coefficients  
This table reports the time-series average coefficients from regression equation (2) 
using RKRV methodology. The dependent variable is the natural log of market value. 
The independent variables are the natural log of book value, the natural log of the 
absolute value of net income, a dummy variable indicating a negative NI, and market 
leverage. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally from fiscal years 1986–2009. 
 














Number of Obs 24 





Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the statistics of all variables used in this paper. 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependant Variables 
PreMis 3.15508 2.98131 
CAR -0.0175 0.1697 
Discounting 0.0277 0.0685 
Underpricing 0.0164 0.0390 
Lret3 0.01075 0.04926 
Lret6 0.00832 0.03478 
Lret12 0.00728 0.02145 
Investor Sentiment Proxies 
ICSR 0.409 6.521 
CBINDR 2.558 10.40 
BCR 0.894 12.15 
BW -0.0122 0.884 
Control Variables 
Rpremia -0.299 0.247 
InfoAs 0.000858 0.0431 
Growth 4.679 3.237 
Size 0.000322 0.00241 
Uranking 8.149 1.412 
Asset 20.83 1.055 
Lev 0.539 0.184 
Byield 0.00343 0.00165 
SeqREIT 4.445 3.898 
Yearslisted 8.830 9.013 





Table 4.4 Investor Sentiment and pre-SEO Valuation  
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between stock mispricing 
prior to issuance and investor sentiment. Dependent variable is the mispricing level 
(PreMis) prior to SEO issuance. ICSR, CBINDR, and BCR are the investor sentiment 
measures from the Index of Consumer Sentiment, the Index of Consumer Confidence, 
and the Index of Buying Condition, all orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. 
BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. Rpremia is the firm risk premium in the prior 
observation month. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning announcement 
releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. Growth is the component of RKRV 
market-to-book decomposition to control for growth/investment opportunities. Byield 
is the short-term government bond yield prior to the observation month. SeqREIT is 
the current SEO sequence of the REIT itself. Yearslisted is the number of years 
between the SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ equals to one if the firm is listed 
on NASDAQ, zero otherwise. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses and errors are 
clustered.  
Mispricing  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  0.0411***    
  (2.62)    
CBINDR   0.0263***   
   (2.77)   
BCR    0.0339***  
    (4.01)  
BW     0.659*** 
     (3.22) 
Rpremia -0.189 -0.252 -0.222 -0.324 0.130 
 (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.57) (0.22) 
InfoAs -3.583 -3.499 -3.566 -2.579 -3.923* 
 (-1.59) (-1.56) (-1.59) (-1.15) (-1.75) 
Growth -0.0459 -0.0481 -0.0442 -0.0413 -0.0486 
 (-1.38) (-1.45) (-1.33) (-1.25) (-1.47) 
Byield 377.3*** 407.0*** 365.4*** 385.5*** 296.9*** 
 (3.87) (4.16) (3.76) (3.99) (2.97) 
SeqREIT 0.169*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.175*** 
 (5.66) (5.43) (5.45) (4.87) (5.87) 
Yearslisted 0.0288** 0.0305** 0.0290** 0.0299** 0.0245** 
 (2.32) (2.46) (2.34) (2.42) (1.97) 
NASDAQ -0.271 -0.251 -0.250 -0.226 -0.291 
 (-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-0.92) 
Constant -90.42 -126.1** -87.28 -137.9** -82.59 
 (-1.55) (-2.11) (-1.50) (-2.34) (-1.42) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property Type  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Obs No. 840 840 840 840 840 
Adjusted R2 0.0911 0.0975 0.0984 0.107 0.101 
F stat 6.247 6.325 6.378 6.934 6.558 
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Table 4.5 Investor Sentiment and the Probability of SEO Issuance 
This table presents the results from the probit model for SEO issuance. Dependent 
variable equals one if an SEO is observed, zero otherwise. ICSR, CBINDR and BCR 
are the investor sentiment measures from the Index of the Index of Consumer 
Sentiment from Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan, the Index of Consumer 
Confidence from the Conference Board, the Index of Buying Condition from 
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan, all orthogonalized on macroeconomic 
variables. BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. Rpremia is the firm risk premium in the prior 
observation month. Byield is the short-term government bond yield prior observation 
month. Asset is total asset. Clev is change in leverage ratio prior observation month. 
Lev is leverage ratio prior observation month. Growth is the third component of 
RKRV market-to-book decomposition to control for the market reaction 
associated with growth/ investment opportunities. InfoAs is the abnormal 
return around earning announcement releases as a proxy for information 
asymmetry.  Size is the relative SEO shares offering size scaled by market 
capitalization. Uranking is the underwriters’ reputation. Yearslisted is the number of 
years between the observation year and the IPO year. NASDAQ equals to one if the 
firm is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise. Accounting data are available on 
quarterly basis from Compustat. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses and errors are 
clustered.  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4            Model 5 
ICSR  0.00280    
  (1.19)    
CBINDR   0.00587***   
   (3.85)   
BCR    0.00461***  
    (3.23)  
BW     0.124** 
     (2.08) 
Rpremia 0.767*** 0.772*** 0.759*** 0.755*** 0.934*** 
 (5.73) (5.75) (5.66) (5.66) (4.00) 
InfoAs -0.134 -0.137 -0.184 -0.109 0.615 
 (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.38) (1.15) 
Growth 0.0215*** 0.0211*** 0.0205*** 0.0206*** 0.0697*** 
 (4.37) (4.27) (4.14) (4.16) (4.81) 
Lev 0.00369 0.00398 0.000488 0.0108 0.338 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.12) (1.36) 
Asset 0.00222 0.00350 0.00137 0.00616 -0.0173 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.07) (0.31) (-1.42) 
Byield 44.73*** 45.59*** 43.72*** 43.63*** 54.23262***    
 (2.93) (2.98) (2.85) (2.86) (3.46) 
NASDAQ 0.102** 0.100** 0.0989** 0.0941* 0.187 
 (2.11) (2.07) (2.04) (1.94) (1.02) 
Yearslisted -0.0108*** -0.0106*** -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0321*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.61) (-5.50) (-5.59) (-4.96) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs No. 26463 26463 26463 26463 26463 
Pseudo R2 0.0184 0.0186 0.0205 0.0198 0.0194 
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Table 4.6 Investor Sentiment and SEO Announcement Effect 
This table presents the results on investor sentiment and the announcement effect 
(CAR).The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
announcement date. ICSR, CBINDR, and BCR are the investor sentiment measures 
from the Index of Consumer Sentiment from Thomson Reuters/University of 
Michigan, the Index of Consumer Confidence from the Conference Board, the Index 
of Buying Condition from Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan, all 
orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. Growth is 
the component of RKRV market-to-book decomposition to control growth/ 
investment opportunities. Size is the SEO proceeds scaled by market capitalization. 
Asset is total assets. Lev is leverage ratio prior to the observation month. Byield is the 
short-term government bond yield prior to the observation month. SeqREIT is the 
current SEO sequence of the REIT itself. Yearslisted is the number of years between 
SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ equals to one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, 
zero otherwise. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses and errors are clustered. 
  CAR  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  -0.000718*    
  (-1.90)    
CBINDR   0.000140   
   (0.61)   
BCR    -0.000887***  
    (-3.93)  
BW     -0.0138*** 
     (-5.87) 
Growth -0.00168** -0.00166** -0.00168** -0.00206*** -0.00151** 
 (-2.21) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.71) (-2.02) 
Size 1.916** 2.065** 1.870** 2.223** 1.910** 
 (2.11) (2.27) (2.05) (2.46) (2.15) 
Asset 0.00533* 0.00578* 0.00513 0.00711** 0.00511* 
 (1.69) (1.83) (1.61) (2.25) (1.65) 
Lev -0.00389 -0.00560 -0.00338 -0.00812 -0.00299 
 (-0.28) (-0.41) (-0.25) (-0.60) (-0.22) 
Byield 0.724 -0.0847 0.634 -0.312 0.787 
 (0.39) (-0.04) (0.34) (-0.17) (0.44) 
SeqREIT 0.0000386 0.0000904 0.0000310 0.0000686 0.0000369 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) 
Yearslisted 0.000171 0.000131 0.000179 0.000211 0.000111 
 (0.63) (0.48) (0.66) (0.79) (0.42) 
NASDAQ 0.0000332 0.000106 -0.000199 -0.000713 -0.00244 
 (0.00) (0.01) (-0.03) (-0.10) (-0.35) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property Type  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs No. 714 714 714 714 714 
Adjusted R2 0.0290 0.0326 0.0281 0.0487 0.0735 
F stat 2.251 2.336 2.145 3.029 4.141 
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Table 4.7 Investor Sentiment and SEO Discounting 
This table presents the result of testing the effects of investor sentiment on SEO 
discounting. The dependent variable is discounting, which is the percentage change 
between the offer price and the closing price on the day prior to SEO issuance. ICSR, 
CBINDR and BCR are the investor sentiment measures from the Index of Consumer 
Sentiment, the Index of Consumer Confidence, and the Index of Buying Condition, 
all orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. 
Rpremia is the firm risk premium in the prior observation month. InfoAs is the 
abnormal return around earning announcement releases as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. Growth is the component of RKRV market-to-book decomposition to 
control for growth/investment opportunities. Size is the SEO proceeds scaled by 
market capitalization. Uranking is the underwriters’ reputation available from Jay 
Ritter’s website. Asset is total asset. Lev is leverage ratio prior to observation month. 
Byield is the short-term government bond yield prior to the observation month. 
SeqREIT is the current SEO sequence of the REIT itself. Yearslisted is the number of 
years between the observation year and the IPO year. NASDAQ equals to one if the 
firm is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise.*, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance levels respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses and errors 
are clustered. 
  Discounting  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  0.00101***    
  (2.67)    
CBINDR   0.000916***   
   (4.00)   
BCR    0.000864***  
    (4.26)  
BW     0.00355 
     (1.31) 
Rpremia -0.00056** -0.00066*** -0.00069*** -0.000637*** -0.00062** 
 (-2.31) (-2.69) (-2.77) (-2.65) (-2.51) 
InfoAs 0.101* 0.108** 0.104* 0.119** 0.105* 
 (1.84) (1.97) (1.92) (2.18) (1.90) 
Growth -0.000157 -0.0000201 0.000146 0.000263 -0.000178 
 (-0.18) (-0.02) (0.17) (0.30) (-0.20) 
Size 0.233 0.130 0.286 0.0405 0.269 
 (0.23) (0.13) (0.28) (0.04) (0.26) 
Uranking -0.00304* -0.00272 -0.00194 -0.00185 -0.00313* 
 (-1.78) (-1.60) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.83) 
Asset 0.00964*** 0.00781** 0.00693* 0.00624* 0.00998*** 
 (2.66) (2.12) (1.89) (1.70) (2.74) 
Lev 0.0149 0.0166 0.0175 0.0206 0.0148 
 (0.95) (1.06) (1.12) (1.32) (0.94) 
Byield -2.160 -1.238 -2.352 -1.521 -2.022 
 (-1.11) (-0.63) (-1.22) (-0.79) (-1.04) 
SeqREIT -0.000705 -0.000696 -0.000666 -0.000948 -0.000718 
 (-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-1.19) (-0.90) 
Yearslisted 0.0000166 0.0000698 0.0000402 0.0000489 0.0000253 
 (0.06) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.09) 
NASDAQ -0.0107 -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.0104 -0.0103 
 (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.36) 
Constant -0.932 -2.129 -1.302 -2.634* -0.829 
 (-0.61) (-1.34) (-0.86) (-1.69) (-0.54) 
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Time 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property 
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Obs No. 840 840 840 840 840 
Adjusted 
R2 0.0645 0.0715 0.0813 0.0837 0.0653 







Table 4.8 Investor Sentiment and SEO Underpricing 
This table presents the results of testing the effects of investor sentiment on SEO 
underpricing. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the percentage change 
in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. ICSR, CBINDR 
and BCR are the investor sentiment measures from the Index of Consumer Sentiment, 
the Index of Consumer Confidence, and the Index of Buying Condition, all 
orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. Rpremia is 
the firm risk premium in the prior observation month. InfoAs is the abnormal return 
around earning announcement releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. 
Growth is the component of RKRV market-to-book decomposition to control growth/ 
investment opportunities. Size is the SEO proceeds scaled by market capitalization. 
Uranking is the underwriters’ reputation. Asset is total asset. Lev is leverage ratio 
prior to the observation month. Byield is the short-term government bond yield prior 
observation month. SeqREIT is the current SEO sequence of the REIT itself. 
Yearslisted is the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ 
equals to one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise.*, ** and *** 
represents the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses and errors are clustered. 
 
  Underpricing  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  0.00107***    
  (5.15)    
CBINDR   0.000589***   
   (4.62)   
BCR    0.000680***  
    (6.04)  
BW     0.00125 
     (0.83) 
Rpremia 0.0514*** 0.0474*** 0.0472*** 0.0465*** 0.0503*** 
 (4.89) (4.57) (4.53) (4.51) (4.75) 
InfoAs 0.0637** 0.0679** 0.0646** 0.0771** 0.0646** 
 (2.09) (2.26) (2.14) (2.57) (2.11) 
Growth -0.000869* -0.000715 -0.000667 -0.000532 -0.00088* 
 (-1.75) (-1.46) (-1.36) (-1.09) (-1.76) 
Size -2.874*** -2.675*** -2.553*** -2.715*** -2.786*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.53) (-3.35) (-3.60) (-3.59) 
Uranking -0.0051*** -0.0047*** -0.0043*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-5.29) (-4.99) (-4.53) (-4.33) (-5.31) 
Asset 0.0054*** 0.00333 0.00356* 0.00264 0.0055*** 
 (2.64) (1.63) (1.74) (1.29) (2.69) 
Lev 0.0150* 0.0167* 0.0165* 0.0193** 0.0150* 
 (1.71) (1.92) (1.90) (2.23) (1.70) 
Byield 4.587*** 5.258*** 4.131*** 4.704*** 4.553*** 
 (3.31) (3.84) (3.01) (3.47) (3.29) 
SeqREIT 0.0000473 0.0000562 0.0000747 -0.000140 0.0000429 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (-0.32) (0.10) 
Yearslisted 0.0000292 0.0000826 0.0000447 0.0000566 0.0000320 
 (0.18) (0.51) (0.28) (0.35) (0.19) 
NASDAQ -0.0126*** -0.0126*** -0.0126*** -0.0124*** -0.012*** 
 (-2.96) (-3.02) (-3.00) (-2.98) (-2.93) 
Constant 0.193 -1.121 -0.100 -1.213 0.216 
 (0.22) (-1.26) (-0.12) (-1.38) (0.25) 
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Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Number of Obs 840 840 840 840 840 
Adjusted R2 0.0929 0.120 0.115 0.131 0.0925 
F stat 5.295 6.462 6.183 7.001 5.074 




Table 4.9 Investor Sentiment and SEO Long-run Risk Adjusted Return 
This table presents the result of testing the effects of investor sentiment on SEO long 
run risk adjusted return. The dependent variable is SEO risk adjusted return for 3, 6, 
and 12 months, respectively.  ICSR, CBINDR and BCR are the investor sentiment 
measures from the Index of Consumer Sentiment, the Index of Consumer Confidence, 
and the Index of Buying Condition, all orthogonalized on macroeconomic variables. 
BW is Baker-Wurgler Index. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning 
announcement releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. Growth is the 
component of RKRV market-to-book decomposition to control for growth/ 
investment opportunities. Size is the SEO proceeds scaled by market capitalization. 
Uranking is the underwriters’ reputation. Asset is total asset. Lev is leverage ratio 
prior observation month. Byield is the short-term government bond yield prior 
observation month. SeqREIT is the current SEO sequence of the REIT itself. 
Yearslisted is the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ 
equals to one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise.*, ** and *** 
represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses and errors are clustered. 
 
Panel A 3 months  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  -0.000335    
  (-1.32)    
CBINDR   -0.0005***   
   (-3.28)   
BCR    -0.000299**  
    (-2.15)  
BW     -0.0041** 
     (-2.17) 
InfoAs -0.00202 -0.00295 -0.00132 -0.00736 -0.00808 
 (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.20) (-0.22) 
Growth -0.0000915 -0.000141 -0.000275 -0.000245 -0.000118 
 (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.20) 
Size 0.186 0.190 0.0966 0.221 0.0825 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.15) (0.33) (0.12) 
Uranking -0.00177 -0.00187 -0.00238** -0.00217* -0.00169 
 (-1.53) (-1.61) (-2.04) (-1.85) (-1.46) 
Asset 0.00781*** 0.00844*** 0.00936*** 0.00901*** 0.00744*** 
 (3.14) (3.34) (3.72) (3.55) (3.00) 
Lev -0.000959 -0.00136 -0.00239 -0.00274 -0.000880 
 (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.26) (-0.09) 
Byield -3.814*** -4.118*** -3.701*** -4.023*** -3.851*** 
 (-2.89) (-3.08) (-2.82) (-3.05) (-2.93) 
SeqREIT -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** 
 (-4.63) (-4.63) (-4.68) (-4.46) (-4.33) 
Yearslisted -0.0000437 -0.0000596 -0.0000522 -0.0000522 -0.0000739 
 (-0.22) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.37) 
NASDAQ -0.00279 -0.00281 -0.00284 -0.00294 -0.00373 
 (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.56) (-0.57) (-0.72) 
Constant 4.642*** 5.042*** 4.837*** 5.247*** 4.536*** 
 (4.52) (4.71) (4.73) (4.93) (4.42) 
Time 




Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs No, 840 840 840 840 840 
Adj. R2 0.0495 0.0503 0.0607 0.0536 0.0538 
F stat 3.297 3.222 3.709 3.378 3.383 
Panel 6 months  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ICSR  -0.000120    
  (-0.76)    
CBINDR   -0.00023**   
   (-2.32)   
BCR    -0.00026***  
    (-3.04)  
BW     -0.00208* 
     (-1.77) 
InfoAs 0.0169 0.0166 0.0172 0.0122 0.0138 
 (0.75) (0.73) (0.76) (0.54) (0.61) 
Growth 0.000452 0.000435 0.000372 0.000318 0.000439 
 (1.21) (1.16) (0.99) (0.85) (1.18) 
Size -0.0186 -0.0174 -0.0581 0.0114 -0.0713 
 (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.14) (0.03) (-0.17) 
Uranking -0.000483 -0.000519 -0.000749 -0.000833 -0.000443 
 (-0.67) (-0.72) (-1.03) (-1.15) (-0.62) 
Asset -0.000537 -0.000310 0.000146 0.000519 -0.000724 
 (-0.35) (-0.20) (0.09) (0.33) (-0.47) 
Lev 0.00741 0.00727 0.00678 0.00585 0.00745 
 (1.15) (1.13) (1.06) (0.91) (1.16) 
Byield -2.836*** -2.944*** -2.786*** -3.019*** -2.855*** 










 (-3.25) (-3.24) (-3.28) (-3.02) (-3.00) 
Yearslisted -0.000137 -0.000143 -0.000141 -0.000145 -0.000153 
 (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.18) (-1.24) 
NASDAQ 0.0000919 0.0000852 0.0000711 -0.0000367 -0.000380 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (-0.01) (-0.12) 
Constant 1.782*** 1.926*** 1.868*** 2.312*** 1.729*** 
 (2.80) (2.90) (2.93) (3.51) (2.71) 
      
Time 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property 
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Obs No, 840 840 840 840 840 
Adj. R2 0.0365 0.0360 0.0416 0.0461 0.0390 





  Panel C 12 months  




*   
 
  (-2.71)    





   (-2.06)   
BCR    -0.0000238  
    (-0.50)  
BW     -0.00289*** 
     (-2.63) 
InfoAs 0.0151 0.0144 0.0152 0.0146 0.0159 










 (2.63) (2.47) (2.43) (2.55) (2.63) 
Size 0.0763 0.0787 0.0570 0.0791 0.0582 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.25) (0.35) (0.26) 
Uranking 0.000274 0.000203 0.000144 0.000242 0.000243 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.36) (0.60) (0.61) 
Asset -0.00205** -0.00161* -0.00172** -0.00196** -0.00184** 
 (-2.42) (-1.86) (-1.99) (-2.25) (-2.17) 
Lev 0.00484 0.00455 0.00453 0.00469 0.00464 
 (1.36) (1.29) (1.28) (1.32) (1.31) 
Byield 0.501 0.289 0.526 0.485 0.969** 
 (1.11) (0.63) (1.17) (1.07) (2.01) 
SeqREIT -0.0000813 -0.0000788 -0.0000841 -0.0000741 -0.000128 
 (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.69) 
Yearsliste
d 0.0000183 0.00000720 0.0000165 0.0000177 0.0000332 
 (0.27) (0.11) (0.24) (0.26) (0.49) 
NASDAQ 0.0000367 0.0000234 0.0000265 0.0000250 0.000229 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) 
Constant -1.017*** -0.737** -0.975*** -0.969*** -0.999*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.02) (-2.77) (-2.66) (-2.85) 
      
Time 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property 
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Obs No, 840 840 840 840 840 
Adjusted 
R2 0.0303 0.0378 0.0341 0.0294 0.0373 




Table 4.10 Asymmetric Effect of Investor Sentiment 
This table presents the asymmetric effect of sentiment on SEO pricing. High 
sentiment is the interaction variable between sentiment and high sentiment defined as 
the sentiment above 66 percentile. Dependent variable in column [1] is Discounting. 
Dependent variable in column [2] is Underpricing. Rpremia is the firm risk premium 
in the prior observation month. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning 
announcement releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. Growth is the market-
to-book decomposition component to control for growth/ investment opportunities. 
Size is the SEO proceeds scaled by market capitalization. Uranking is the 
underwriters’ reputation. Asset is total assets. Lev is leverage ratio prior to the 
observation month. Byield is the short-term government bond yield prior to the 
observation month. SeqREIT is the current SEO sequence for the REIT itself. 
Yearslisted is the number of years between the SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ 
equals to one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise.*, ** and *** 
represents the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses and errors are clustered. 
 
Variables Discounting Underpricing 
HighSentiment 0.00154** 0.00119*** 
 (2.31) (3.24) 
CBINDR 0.000176 0.0000101 
 (0.45) (0.05) 
Rpremia -0.000743*** 0.0450*** 
 (-3.06) (4.34) 
InfoAs 0.117** 0.0726** 
 (2.14) (2.41) 
Growth 0.000264 -0.000574 
 (0.30) (-1.17) 
Size 0.218 -2.439*** 
 (0.22) (-3.21) 
Uranking -0.00140 -0.00392*** 
 (-0.81) (-4.08) 
Asset 0.00650* 0.00319 
 (1.78) (1.57) 
Lev 0.0208 0.0190** 
 (1.33) (2.19) 
Byield -1.937 4.289*** 
 (-1.01) (3.14) 
SeqREIT -0.000525 0.000185 
 (-0.66) (0.42) 
Yearslisted 0.0000155 0.0000242 
 (0.05) (0.15) 
NASDAQ -0.0118 -0.0135*** 
 (-1.59) (-3.23) 
Constant -1.220 -0.0557 
 (-0.81) (-0.07) 
Time Effect Yes Yes 
Property Type Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 840 840 
Adjusted R2 0.0865 0.125 




Table 4.11 Decision to Issue in High Sentiment Period  
This table presents the result of possibility that REITs of different risk levels conduct 
SEOs during high/low sentiment. Low sentiment is defined as below 33 percentile. 
High sentiment is defined as above 66 percentile. Dependent variable equals one if an 
SEO is observed in high sentiment period, zero otherwise. Rpremia is the firm risk 
premium in the prior observation month. InfoAs is the abnormal return around earning 
announcement releases as a proxy for information asymmetry. Growth is the market-
to-book decomposition component to control growth/ investment opportunities. Size 
is the SEO proceeds scaled by market capitalization. Uranking is the underwriters’ 
reputation. Asset is total asset. Lev is leverage ratio prior observation month. Byield is 
the short-term government bond yield prior observation month. SeqREIT is the 
current SEO sequence for the REIT. Yearslisted is the number of years between the 
SEO year and the IPO year. NASDAQ equals to one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, 
zero otherwise.*, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level 
respectively. T-statistics are included in parentheses and errors are clustered. 
 






















Time Effect Yes 
Property Type Yes 
   
Number of Obs 840 






CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Background 
Real estate composes a significant part of firm’s portfolio, which is often 
deployed for project financing in the capital market. The development of 
securitized real estate has further bridged the capital market and the real estate 
market, which makes the real estate strategies feasible for both corporate and 
individual investors. This thesis deepens the understanding of real estate in 
capital market by addressing following three questions (1) how real estate risk 
influences corporate policies; (2) how securitized real estate manages the 
liquidity risk; (3) how investors’ behaviour affects the pricing in securitized 
real estate market. 
 
5.2 Summary of Major Findings and Implications  
In the first essay, I ask how capital heterogeneity influences corporate 
investment given that an option to grow the company through investment is 
subject to the riskiness of the firm’s asset. Specifically, I examine how real 
estate risk impacts corporate policies. Previous studies identify real estate 
factor that explains much of the underlying risk inherent in classic asset 
pricing models via its collateral effects and its irreversibility. If investors 
understand the firm’s exposure to real estate risk, real estate risk should be 
correlated closely with both corporate investment and financing decisions 
made by firms. Using the US general firm data from 1985 to 2010, I include 
shocks to the real estate market as a proxy for state-variable risk in the asset 
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pricing model and construct the real estate risk factor at the firm level. 
Evidence shows that real estate risk is negatively associated with firms’ long-
term investments and long-term external financing in both equity and debt. 
However, the leverage depends on both the measure of risk and types of 
assets. Overall, in contrast to previously documented effect of the real estate 
value, risk exposure exhibits the mostly opposite effects on investment, 
financing, and capital structure.  
In the second essay, I look into the characteristics of the securitized real estate, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). I explore how REITs manage the 
liquidity risk in the equity market considering that real estate is less liquid 
compared with other asset classes in nature. The empirical corporate finance 
literature claims that information asymmetries would induce market frictions, 
which reduce the liquidity of the firm’s securities. However, real activities 
manipulation may reduce the concern given its cash flow consequences. Given 
the high dividend payout feature and restricted investment options on real 
estate assets, REITs managers are inclined to engage in real earnings 
management activities over accrual based manipulation compared to general 
firms. Particularly, I apply a recently developed liquidity-augmented asset 
pricing model to measure the liquidity risk and market risk for SEO firms to 
revisit the window of opportunity and risk-return trade-off hypotheses debated 
in the literature. I show that REITs managers engage in real earnings 
management to attract more uninformed trading in order to provide the 
liquidity services at lower cost during seasoned equity offerings. I find less 
liquid REITs are more likely to manipulate earnings prior equity offerings, and 
uninformed trading is higher following the real earnings management. REITs 
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set the offer price at a smaller discount after engaging in real earnings 
management and stock returns decline in the long run. The findings are 
consistent with real option and liquidity explanations for equity offerings. 
In the third essay, I study the pricing of securitized real estate market from a 
behavioural perspective. I answer whether investor sentiment contributes to 
the price anomaly in REITs equity offerings, empirically addressing that 
REITs managers time the market to issue equity by timing the sentiment 
investors and the behaviour of investors impacts price formation around 
seasoned equity offerings. Consistent with the notion that market interprets 
SEO announcement in high sentiment periods as more negative signal, I find 
that announcement returns are negatively related to sentiment. Further, I 
document that investor sentiment is positively related with the SEO 
discounting and first day returns. Finally, sentiment does not seem to proxy for 
unobservable risk characteristic as I find that post-SEO long run returns are 
more negative in high sentiment periods.  
Overall, this thesis emphasizes the importance of real estate in corporate 
investment and corporate financing strategies. This research provides 
significant information on real estate values from novel perspectives as well as 
guidance to the corporate policy decisions making for different firm managers. 
 
5.3 Limitations and Further Research 
No research is free from limitations. In this section, the discussion of future 
research of every essay is presented. 
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The first essay shed light on the importance of real estate risk in firm’s 
investment and financing decisions. However, there are some limitations that 
may cause potential problems in the empirical results. First, not every firm 
hold corporate real estate, there are some firms that lease the corporate real 
estate instead hold the corporate real estate, which are excluded in this 
research’s study sample. So the unobserved heterogeneity might bias the 
empirical results. Second, due to the data unavailability, geographic 
characteristics of real estate might affect the empirical results. Future research 
will try to address these issues, while explore the effect of real estate risk on 
other areas of corporate policies like the use of private placements and tax 
shields. 
In the second essay, I show that real earnings management plays an important 
role in REITs seasoned equity offerings. Recent research indicates that 
security issuers often exercise large real investment options around equity 
offering, suggesting endogenous corporate investment/financing decision 
determined by firm’s asset in place. Considering the transparency of REITs, 
REITs managers may have more freedom on CAPEX allowances. One line of 
future research will be to link up property disposition and acquisition with the 
real earnings management activities in the empirical analysis.  
In the third essay, despite my best efforts to control for fundamentals like 
time-varying growth opportunities and risk premia, it is not impossible that 
there is unobservable fundamental risk factor responsible for some of my 
results. Future work may focus on identifying these factors and integrating 
them in the analysis. Meanwhile, given that REITs pay dividends in excess of 
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90% minimum threshold, it would also be interesting to consider the 
alternative external capital resources other than equity offerings for REITs 
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Appendix 4.1 Variables Definition 
Variable Name Definition Data Sources 
Panel A: Variables of Interests 
PreMis 
The mispricing level prior to SEO issuance using 
RKRV methodology 




Cumulative abnormal return around SEO 




The percentage change in the price between the 
offer price and the previous-day closing price.  
Offer price: SDC; 
Previous day closing 
price: CRSP 
Underpricing 
The percentage change in the price between the 
offer price and the first-day closing price.  
Offer price: SDC; 
First-day closing price: 
CRSP 
Lret Post-SEO long run return 
Stock price: 
CRSP 
Panel B: Sentiment Measures 
ICS 
Index of Consumer Sentiment constructed by 
University of Michigan Survey Research Centre, 
beginning in 1947 on a quarterly basis (month 2, 5, 
8, 11) and changing to monthly basis in 1978. 
Michael Lemmon 
share the data and I 
update it by 
Bloomberg 
ICSR 
Residual sentiment measure obtained by 
orthogonalizing ICS on a set of macroeconomic 
variables, following Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006). 
Michael Lemmon 
share the data and I 
update it by 
Bloomberg 
CBIND 
Index of Consumer Confidence constructed by the 
Conference Board, beginning on a bimonthly basis 
in 1967 (month 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) and changing to a 
monthly survey in 1977. 
Michael Lemmon 
share the data and I 
update it by 
Bloomberg 
CBINDR 
Residual sentiment measure obtained by 
orthogonalizing CBIND on a set of macroeconomic 
variables, following Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006).  
Michael Lemmon 
share the data and I 
update it by 
Bloomberg 
BC 
The buying condition survey conducted by 
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan 




Residual sentiment measure obtained by 
orthogonalizing BC on a set of macroeconomic 
variables, following Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006). 




The Baker and Wurgler Index, based on the 
dividend premium, closed-end fund discount and 
NYSE turnover.  
Wurgler’s website 
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variables (as defined in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)) 
DIV 
Dividend yield is measured as the total cash ordinary 
dividend of the CRSP value-weighted index over the 
last three months and divided by the value of the index 
at the end of the current month, calculated with the 
CRSP value-weighted returns monthly index with and 
without dividend, as in Fama and French (1998) and 





Default spread, monthly, is measured as the difference 
between the yields to maturity on Moody’s Baa-rated 
and Aaa-rated bonds.  
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
 
YLD3 The yield on three-month Treasury bills, monthly.  
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
GDP 
GDP growth, measured as 100 times the quarterly 
change in the natural logarithm of chained (2005 
dollars) GDP.  
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
CONS 
Consumption growth, measured as 100 times the 
quarterly change in the natural logarithm of personal 
consumption expenditures.  
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
LABOR 
Labor income growth, measured as 100 times the 
quarterly change in the natural logarithm of labor 
income, computed as total personal income minus 
dividend income, per capita and deflated by the PCE 
deflator. 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
URATE Unemployment rate, monthly and seasonally adjusted.  
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics  
CPI 




Consumption-to-wealth ratio, from Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001). 




Panel D: SEO Characteristics 
Sales The sales of the prior fiscal year before offering Compustat 
Rpremia 




The abnormal return around earning announcement 
releases as a proxy for information asymmetry.  
 
Growth 
Market-to-book decomposition component to control 




SEO shares offering size scaled by market 
capitalization 
SDC 
Uranking the underwriters’ reputation Jay Ritter’s Website 
Asset Asset is total asset in natural logarithm Compustat 
Lev Leverage ratio prior observation month Compustat 
Byield 
The short-term government bond yield prior 
observation month. 
CRSP 
SeqREIT The current SEO sequence regarding the REIT itself. SDC 
Yearslisted 
The number of years between the observation year and 
the IPO year 
SDC,SNL 
NASDAQ 
 NASDAQ equals to one if the firm is listed on 
NASDAQ, zero otherwise. 
CRSP 
 
 
